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In the fall of 2013, Erin Cox received a telephone call from
an intoxicated friend who was too drunk to drive herself home
1
from a party, so Erin went to get her. Police officers were there
2
when she arrived and initially detained her. When they realized why she came and that she had no alcohol in her system,
they released her and later submitted an affidavit confirming
3
these facts. But when school officials learned of the event, they
insisted that Erin had violated the school’s discipline policy because she had been “in the presence of ” alcohol, and took action
4
against her. A few years ago, a school took action against a
middle school student, Benjamin Ratner, for coming to the immediate aid of a friend. Benjamin took possession of a suicidal
friend’s bookbinder that contained a knife, doing so to prevent

1. Doyle Murphy, Massachusetts Honor Student Punished for Driving
Drunken Friend Home from Party, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 15, 2013),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/drunk-logic-sober-teen-suspended
-driving-friend-home-party-article-1.1486179.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Derek Black, School Changing Its Story, EDUC. L. PROF BLOG (Oct. 16,
2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/education_law/2013/10/school
-changing-its-story-on-why-it-suspended-student-who-drove-her-drunk-friend
-home.html.
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5

his friend from using it against herself. For his good deed, the
6
district expelled him for the remainder of the year. Finally, one
middle school expelled a sixth grade boy—whom the school described as a model student—for unknowingly bringing his min7
iature Swiss army knife to school in his backpack.
Similar stories, more and less serious, abound. Over the
last two decades, suspension and expulsion rates in schools
8
have doubled. The adoption of zero tolerance discipline policies
has fueled this rise, not increased student misbehavior. Zero
tolerance policies have expanded the categories of behavior for
which a student can and must be suspended and expelled.
Whether a student’s misbehavior is serious, trivial, intentional,
or accidental, the response in many districts is the same: exclusion from school. In fact, schools themselves report that minor
misbehaviors, like disruption and disrespect, account for nine9
ty-five percent of suspensions and expulsions. As a result,
some schools suspend one out of every two students over the
10
course of each school year.
School districts insist that these suspensions and expul11
sions are necessary to maintain order and safety. Students
have challenged zero tolerance as a violation of due process, but
even in cases as extreme as those above, lower courts consistently conclude that the Constitution provides no meaningful
12
check on these policies. As the Fourth Circuit wrote in Benja5. Ratner v. Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Sch., 16 F. App’x 140, 141 (4th Cir.
2001) (per curiam).
6. Id.
7. Colvin ex rel. Colvin v. Lowndes Cnty. Miss. Sch. Dist., 114 F. Supp.
2d 504, 507–08 (N.D. Miss. 1999).
8. DANIEL J. LOSEN & RUSSELL SKIBA, S. POVERTY LAW CTR., SUSPENDED EDUCATION: URBAN MIDDLE SCHOOLS IN CRISIS 2 (2010), available at
http://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/downloads/publication/Suspended_
Education.pdf.
9. DANIEL J. LOSEN & TIA ELENA MARTINEZ, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT,
OUT OF SCHOOL AND OFF TRACK: THE OVERUSE OF SUSPENSIONS IN AMERICAN
MIDDLE AND HIGH SCHOOLS 8 (2013), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla
.edu/resources/projects/center-for-civil-rights-remedies/school-to-prison
-folder/federal-reports/out-of-school-and-off-track-the-overuse-of-suspensions
-in-american-middle-and-high-schools/OutofSchool-OffTrack_UCLA_4-8.pdf.
10. Eduardo Ferrer, District Discipline: The Overuse of Suspension and
Expulsion in the District of Columbia, DC LAW. FOR YOUTH (June 20, 2013),
http://dcly.org/district_discipline.
11. See generally JUDITH KAFKA, THE HISTORY OF “ZERO TOLERANCE” IN
AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLING 2–3 (2011) (discussing arguments in favor of
zero tolerance policies).
12. See generally id. at 107.
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min Ratner’s case, “[h]owever harsh the result in this case, the
federal courts are not properly called upon to judge the wisdom
13
of a zero tolerance policy.” Lower courts’ cursory and dismissive treatment of the constitutional claims raised in these
cases is unwarranted, but primarily a result of sparse Supreme
Court precedent that leaves lower courts to fill in certain doctrinal gaps on their own. And the gaps are significant.
The concept of zero tolerance in schools was not even on
the foreseeable horizon when the Supreme Court first applied
procedural due process to student discipline in Goss v. Lopez in
14
1975. The Court in Goss announced the general principle that
students are entitled to notice of the charges against them and
15
a chance to respond, but left the specifics of the process open.
The only other Supreme Court decision on point came one
16
month later in Wood v. Strickland, in which the Court held
that students could seek monetary damages for due process violations, but that the lower court had erred in failing to defer to
the school’s construction of its own disciplinary code. With only
these sparse guideposts, lower courts’ approach to zero tolerance has been of their own making. Rather than substantively
engage the constitutional issues implicated by discipline, they
have increasingly found that so long as a student receives some
rudimentary procedural due process they will not “secondguess” the substance of school rules or their application, even
17
in egregious instances like those mentioned above.
Lower courts have been so consistently emphatic in their
position that scholars and advocates have all but conceded the
18
constitutionality of zero tolerance. Some do no more than call
19
for voluntary policy changes. Others implicitly assume the
13. Ratner v. Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Sch., 16 F. App’x 140, 142 (4th Cir.
2001) (per curiam).
14. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
15. Id.
16. 420 U.S. 308 (1975). In 1982, the Court did issue a per curiam decision
in Board of Education v. McCluskey, 458 U.S. 966 (1982), but the case is rarely
cited and holds almost no precedential value as the facts are almost exactly
the same as in Wood and the Court simply restates that courts would not disregard a school’s reasonable construction of its own rules.
17. Youssef Chouhoud & Perry A. Zirkel, The Goss Progeny: An Empirical
Analysis, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 353, 377–82 (2008).
18. See, e.g., Eric Blumenson & Eva S. Nilsen, One Strike and You’re Out?
Constitutional Constraints on Zero Tolerance in Public Education, 81 WASH.
U. L.Q. 65, 108 (2003); Aaron Sussman, Learning in Lockdown: School Police,
Race, and the Limits of Law, 59 UCLA L. REV. 788, 831–35 (2012).
19. See, e.g., Christina L. Anderson, Double Jeopardy: The Modern Di-
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constitutionality of challenge zero tolerance policies and argue
20
for more robust procedural protections in enforcing them.
Others realize that simply affording more process amounts to
21
doing more of the same. These scholars rightly look to substantive due process solutions, but propose legal theories that
are unsupported by existing precedent and would require
22
courts to rework due process doctrine. Finally, some ignore
due process altogether, believing the only important limitation
23
on discipline is the prohibition on discrimination.
Recognizing the seriousness of the discipline crisis and the
lack of legal solutions, on January 8, 2014, the United States
Departments of Justice and Education released official policy
24
guidance on the administration of discipline. The guidance,
while an important policy enforcement document, offered nothing new in terms of constitutional analysis or privately enforceable rights. Where positive change has occurred, it has been
primarily outside the legal system, coming only recently when
large school districts realized their suspensions and expulsions
had become an epidemic and that they could not operate funclemma for Juvenile Justice, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1181, 1199–2000 (2004); Miriam Rokeach & John Denvir, Front-Loading Due Process: A Dignity-Based Approach to School Discipline, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 277, 300–02 (2006).
20. See, e.g., Emily Bloomenthal, Inadequate Discipline: Challenging Zero
Tolerance Policies As Violating State Constitution Education Clauses, 35
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 303, 326–35 (2011); Amy P. Meek, School Discipline “As Part of the Teaching Process”: Alternative and Compensatory Education Required by the State’s Interest in Keeping Children in School, 28 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 155, 172–83 (2009).
21. See infra note 219 and accompanying text.
22. E.g., Jeffrey D. Jackson, Putting Rationality Back into the Rational
Basis Test: Saving Substantive Due Process and Redeeming the Promise of the
Ninth Amendment, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 491, 530–43 (2011); Rosalie Berger
Levinson, Reining in Abuses of Executive Power Through Substantive Due Process, 60 FLA. L. REV. 519, 555–59 (2008).
23. See, e.g., Zachary W. Best, Derailing the Schoolhouse-to-Jailhouse
Track: Title VI and a New Approach to Disparate Impact Analysis in Public
Education, 99 GEO. L.J. 1671, 1672–74 (2011); Russell J. Skiba et al., African
American Disproportionality in School Discipline: The Divide Between Best Evidence and Legal Remedy, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1071, 1086–89 (2010). Some
do propose a state law theory that has significant merit but which has been
met with mixed reviews in state courts and would be limited to a subset of
states. See e.g., Roni R. Reed, Education and the State Constitutions: Alternatives for Suspended and Expelled Students, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 582, 602–21
(1996).
24. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER ON THE NONDISCRIMINATORY ADMINISTRATION OF SCHOOL DISCIPLINE
(2014), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201401-title
-vi.pdf.
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tional schools without revisiting their zero tolerance policies.
As important as progressive policy developments are—and
some are gaining momentum—past experience with contested
educational practices suggests that zero tolerance and harsh
discipline will remain all too prevalent unless courts intervene
26
to protect students’ constitutional rights. For instance, in 1977
the Court upheld corporal punishment as a permissible means
27
of discipline in schools. A national consensus subsequently
turned against the practice, but over thirty years later, corporal
punishment continues as a regular occurrence in twenty-one
states, resulting in the paddling or “beating” of over two hun28
dred thousand students a year. There is little reason to expect
anything different with zero tolerance, particularly when courts
so willingly sanction it. Even if political efforts might end zero
tolerance in the future, today’s expelled and suspended students are entitled to a reasoned constitutional response now.
Suspension and expulsion have never been minor occurrences
in students’ lives, but today they are the functional equivalent
of educational death penalties and second-class citizenship for
29
a whole class of students.
Serious and substantive examination of, rather than perfunctory glances at, zero tolerance and harsh discipline reveals
that the Constitution does place meaningful limits on these discipline policies. The recognition of these limits, moreover, is
consistent with Supreme Court precedent. This Article argues
that fundamental principles of substantive due process call into
question zero tolerance and overly harsh discipline. While acknowledging the general permissiveness of the applicable substantive due process test—rational basis—this Article argues
that rational basis review requires courts to engage in reasoned
and logical analysis of schools’ disciplinary goals, including the
legitimacy of the goals and the extent to which suspension and
25. See generally Lizette Alvarez, Seeing the Toll, Schools Revise Zero Tolerance, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2013, at A1 (discussing a growing national trend
among large school districts of moving away from zero tolerance disciplinary
policies and towards in-school solutions to student misbehavior).
26. The Supreme Court refused to intervene in corporal punishment in
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
27. Id.
28. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, A VIOLENT EDUCATION: CORPORAL PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN IN U.S. PUBLIC SCHOOLS 2–3 (2008). Many of these students also suffer from serious long-term emotional, academic, and social effects beyond the corporal punishment itself. Id. at 50–60.
29. See infra notes 50–54 and accompanying text.
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expulsion further those goals. Given the deference owed
schools, this basic analysis will, in most instances, favor
schools. But this propensity is not an excuse for courts to abdicate the analysis altogether. A commitment to the analysis will
reveal that some policies and punishments are so irrational
that they cannot be defended.
The most significant contribution of this Article is to go one
step beyond the basic doctrine of substantive due process and
demonstrate that certain processes, principles, and considerations are so inherent in due process that schools cannot legitimately levy punishment without them, even if doing so might
have some administrative benefit for schools. This Article devotes the bulk of its analysis to identifying those inherent principles and applying them to zero tolerance and harsh discipline.
The first principle precludes the state from categorizing and
punishing significantly dissimilar individuals as though they
30
are the same. A student with an aspirin in his pocket for a
headache is not a drug dealer, and a student who accidentally
brings fingernail clippers to school is not a murderer or terrorist. A school may have a rational basis to impose some punishment on those students, but it has no rational basis to expel
and treat them as though they are the same as their criminal
counterparts. Substantive due process requires that these punished students share some significant and relevant characteristic(s), not just that they share some identifiable characteristic.
The second principle precludes the state from severely punishing “innocent” students, i.e., students who engage in innocu31
ous behavior and/or make good-faith mistakes. The very purpose of due process is to sort the guilty from the innocent, or in
the words of Goss v. Lopez, to determine whether punishment
32
is “warranted.” Rules and prohibitions that render this distinction irrelevant violate substantive due process. No amount
of hearings and appeals can cure this flaw because the outcome
of each hearing and appeal would be premised on an underlying rule that ignores substantive innocence. This is not to say,
however, that valid rules never result in the punishment of the
innocent. We know this occurs, but we deem those instances to
33
be errors. These errors are the result of practicalities that
prevent the perfect application of substantively valid rules. In
30.
31.
32.
33.

See infra notes 263–274 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 275–284 and accompanying text.
419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975).
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976).
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contrast, a rule that by design punishes the innocent, and insists that doing so is not an error, lacks a legitimate justification. Intentionally punishing innocent individuals is not the result of an inherently imperfect process.
The third principle requires the state to distinguish between dissimilarly situated individuals by giving consideration
to, at least, three individualized factors: intent, culpability, and
harm. The general rule within our legal system and due process
traditions is that, without some level of pertinent intent, the
state lacks a legitimate basis upon which to punish an individ34
ual’s behavior. There are, of course, exceptions, but they are
limited and require specific justification from the state. An individual’s culpability and blameworthiness, likewise, bear directly on the legitimacy of the state’s interest in imposing pun35
ishment. This is not to suggest that substantive due process
requires strict proportionality between punishment and culpability or harm, but it does prohibit a complete disconnect between these factors. The Supreme Court has been most cautious in policing this disconnect when the state imposes
ultimate or extreme consequences, and most protective when
the subjects of this punishment are children because, as a class,
36
they have diminished mental capacity and culpability.
Finally, due process principles require that these factors,
along with any other inquiries relevant to a particular punishment, be considered in the context of the procedures afforded
and the evidence presented, not prejudged or predetermined.
The law, based on reasoned policy and empirical facts, can pre37
sume certain facts to be true, but it cannot presume facts for
which there is no reasoned justification, nor make them effec38
tively irrebuttable. Doing so eliminates the purpose of afford34. See Joseph E. Kennedy, Making the Crime Fit the Punishment, 51
EMORY L.J. 753, 761 (2002).
35. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,
409 (2003); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568, 575 (1996).
36. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464–66, 2475 (2012) (striking
down mandatory life without parole for minors). See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–73 (2005) (focusing on minors’ reduced culpability
and capacity in striking down capital punishment).
37. See, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 195–97
(1973).
38. See, e.g., Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647, 660–61 (1978) (turning on
whether the irrebuttable presumption of fact was universally true); Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 644–50 (1974) (same). In the criminal
context, the state is prohibited from even “shifting of the burden of persuasion
with respect to [an important] fact,” much less creating irrebuttable presump-
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ing process and deprives individuals of the individualized consideration of their case to which they are entitled.
Zero tolerance and harsh discipline policies routinely violate all of the foregoing substantive due process principles.
Such policies frequently refuse to distinguish between dissimilarly situated individuals—for instance, the drug dealer and
the student with an aspirin or, for that matter, the drug dealer
and the disrespectful student. The disregard for distinctions between students is so extreme that many zero tolerance policies
would expel an otherwise innocent student, such as a student
who may have had a prohibited item in his backpack or car, but
39
did not know it was there. Given this callousness, it is no surprise that zero tolerance and harsh discipline preclude the consideration of core due process inquiries: a student’s intent, culpability, or harm to the educational environment. Moreover,
they preclude these factors in the context of imposing the most
extreme punishment—banishment from school permanently or
the remainder of the year—the very context in which substantive due process demands that the state be most attentive to
these considerations. Even when these inquiries are not entirely precluded, they are prejudged with irrebuttable presumptions that reduce many disciplinary hearings to charades that
go through the motions of process, but do not deliberate its substantive inquiries. Thus, contrary to the general assumption of
lower courts, many aspects of zero tolerance and harsh discipline are unconstitutional.
These overreaches of school authority have grown so gross
that intervention by the Supreme Court is increasingly plausible. Although on different constitutional grounds, the Court in
recent years has been willing to strike down overly-invasive
strip searches of students and coercive custodial interrogations
40
on school grounds. This Article provides the constitutional
analysis by which the Court can do the same in zero tolerance
without altering existing precedent.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I further explains
the extent of the suspension and expulsion crisis in schools, explores whether its cause is school policy or student misbehavior, and articulates the goals that schools seek to promote with
their policies. Part II analyzes the role and rationale of courts
tions. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210, 215 (1977).
39. See, e.g., Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 571–72 (6th Cir. 2000).
40. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011); Safford Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009).
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in school discipline, tracing the Supreme Court’s initial intervention in the early 1970s to the lower courts’ disengagement
today. In particular, it identifies the goals and limits of Goss v.
Lopez and lower courts’ flawed interpretation of Wood v. Strickland. Part III explains and applies the substantive due process
theory by which to limit zero tolerance and overly harsh discipline. The Article concludes with a brief, forward-looking discussion of the efficacy of pursuing this doctrine.
I. THE CURRENT CRISIS IN DISCIPLINE
A. THE RISE AND BREADTH OF EXPULSIONS AND SUSPENSIONS
School discipline has entered a new era in terms of its
breadth and seriousness. In the years leading up to the Court’s
41
decision in Goss v. Lopez, the annual suspension rate for all
racial groups, except African Americans, was below ten per42
cent. The total number of annual suspensions was about one
43
and a half million. Since then, the number of suspensions has
doubled and the rate for each demographic group has increased
44
significantly. Today, the suspension rate for African Americans in middle and high school is a staggering twenty-four percent and above ten percent for every other major demographic
45
group except Asians. The numbers are even worse for some
46
subpopulations. These problems have also crept into elementary schools, where suspension and expulsion previously almost
47
never occurred, but are now routine. These national numbers
mask an outright crisis in many individual districts and
schools. In the 2009–10 academic year, over five hundred
schools in the country suspended more than half of their stu-

41. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
42. LOSEN & MARTINEZ, supra note 9, at 1 fig.1 (showing that in 1972–73
the suspension rates among black students was 11.8%, among Latino students
was 6.1%, among White students was 6%, among American Indian students
was 5.6%, and among Asian and Pacific Island students was 2.4%, and showing that the suspension rates in 2009–10 for each group was 24.3%, 12%, 8.4%,
7.1%, and 2.3%, respectively).
43. Rokeach & Denvir, supra note 19, at 282.
44. Id.
45. LOSEN & MARTINEZ, supra note 9, at 1.
46. Id. at 3 (showing that disabled students are suspended at a rate of
19.3%).
47. JUDITH A. BROWNE, ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, DERAILED: THE
SCHOOLHOUSE TO JAILHOUSE TRACK 11 (2003).
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48

dents. Some middle schools in the District of Columbia Public
49
Schools have twice as many suspensions as they do students.
The significance of suspension and expulsion has also
grown to the point where they are more appropriately understood as de facto educational death penalties than as corrective
50
or management tools. A suspension is not a one-time event for
many students. Roughly forty percent of the student suspen51
sions in any given school year are multiple suspensions. In
Texas, students who were suspended or expelled just once during middle or high school were subsequently suspended or ex52
pelled, on median, three more times. These suspended students are not intrinsically predisposed to repeated misbehavior.
Rather, longitudinal studies show that suspension reinforces a
student’s poor behavior and/or the subjective perception that
53
the child is a troublemaker. Thus, suspension becomes a predictor, rather than a deterrent, of later suspension and disci54
pline problems.
A single suspension, similarly, places students at high risk
of long-term expulsion, drop-out, unemployment, and ultimate55
ly prison. Studies reveal that suspension and expulsion are
48. LOSEN & MARTINEZ, supra note 9, at 3.
49. Ferrer, supra note 10.
50. Mark Yudof used the term “Academic Capital Punishment” as early as
1975, Mark G. Yudof, Suspension and Expulsion of Black Students from the
Public Schools: Academic Capital Punishment and the Constitution, 39 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 374, 374 (1975), but his use was more hyperbolic than analytical. He did not actually use the term in the text of his article.
51. See MASS. ADVOCACY CTR., THE WAY OUT: STUDENT EXCLUSION
PRACTICES IN BOSTON MIDDLE SCHOOLS 53 (1986) (studying Boston middle
school students); see also Christine Bowditch, Getting Rid of Troublemakers:
High School Disciplinary Procedures and the Production of Dropouts, 40 SOC.
PROBS. 493, 498–99 (1993) (showing that 35.2% of students suspended were
suspended for repeated school violations); Virginia Costenbader & Samia
Markson, School Suspension: A Study with Secondary School Students, 36 J.
SCH. PSYCHOL. 59, 70–71 (1998) (showing that 37% of students suspended at
least once believed that they would be suspended again in the future).
52. TONY FABELO ET AL., BREAKING SCHOOLS’ RULES: A STATEWIDE
STUDY OF HOW SCHOOL DISCIPLINE RELATES TO STUDENTS’ SUCCESS AND JUVENILE
JUSTICE
INVOLVEMENT
37–38
(2011),
available
at
http://issuu.com/csgjustice/docs/breaking_schools_rules_report_final-1/1?e=
2448066/1603396.
53. Linda M. Raffaele Mendez, Predictors of Suspension and Negative
School Outcomes: A Longitudinal Investigation, 99 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR
YOUTH DEV. 17, 25, 28–29 (2003); Tary Tobin et al., Patterns in Middle School
Discipline Records, 4 J. EMOTIONAL & BEHAV. DISORDERS 82, 91 (1996).
54. Tobin et al., supra note 53, at 91.
55. Id.
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one of the most significant factors in a student’s decision to
56
drop out of school, and, for many students, dropping out may
not be entirely voluntary. Under pressure to improve standardized test scores in recent decades, some schools have used suspension and expulsion as a way to rid themselves of undesira57
ble low-performing students. Regardless of the cause, fifty
percent of students who drop out of school become unem58
ployed. A significant percentage of drop outs, for predictable
59
reasons, are subsequently incarcerated. The path from suspension to prison is not happenstance. Various studies document how the school discipline system has become a pipeline
into the prison system, increasing students’ risk of contact with
the criminal justice system and directly referring students to
60
the juvenile justice system.
In other words, suspension and expulsion are not temporary withdrawals of education services that scare students
straight. Rather, as the Fifth Circuit wrote of expulsion in
1974:
[A] sentence of banishment from the local educational system is, insofar as the institution has power to act, the extreme penalty, the ultimate punishment. In our increasingly technological society getting at
least a high school education is almost necessary for survival. Stripping a child of access to educational opportunity is a life sentence to
61
second-rate citizenship. . . .

56. See, e.g., id.
57. Michelle Fine, Why Urban Adolescents Drop Into and Out of Public
High School, 87 TCHRS. C. REC. 393, 403–04 (1986); Davin Rosborough, Left
Behind, and Then Pushed Out: Charting a Jurisprudential Framework To
Remedy Illegal Student Exclusions, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 663, 665–66 (2010).
58. Rokeach & Denvir, supra note 19, at 286.
59. See generally id. (“[A]s much as 80% of the prison population is composed of high school dropouts.”).
60. See, e.g., ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, TEST, PUNISH, AND PUSH-OUT:
HOW “ZERO TOLERANCE” AND HIGH STAKES TESTING FUNNEL YOUTH INTO THE
SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 3, 18–19 (2010), http://b.3cdn.net/advancement/
d05cb2181a4545db07_r2im6caqe.pdf; FLA. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, DELINQUENCY IN FLORIDA’S SCHOOLS: A FOUR YEAR STUDY 5–6, 17–18 (2009),
available at http://www.djj.state.fl.us/docs/research2/2007-2008_delinquency_
school_analysis.pdf; Katayoon Majd, Students of the Mass Incarceration Nation, 54 HOW. L.J. 343, 347–48 (2011); Reed, supra note 23, at 606; Terence P.
Thornberry et al., The Effect of Dropping Out of High School on Subsequent
Criminal Behavior, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 3, 7 (1985); see also Gary Sweeten, Who
Will Graduate? Disruption of High School Education by Arrest and Court Involvement, 23 JUST. Q. 462, 471–75 (2006) (analyzing the effect of juvenile delinquency referral on a student’s graduation).
61. Lee v. Macon Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 490 F.2d 458, 460 (5th Cir. 1974).
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Today students’ prospects are worse. The entry qualifications to higher education and meaningful work are sufficiently
high, the interaction between schools and the criminal justice
system so tight, and the risk factors so well documented, that
suspensions and expulsions are the functional equivalent of
permanently ending many students’ educational careers and
condemning them to jail. While this connection is not an absolute, it is likely and serious.
B. THE CAUSAL EXPLANATION FOR INCREASED EXPULSION AND
SUSPENSION
One might assume that increased student misbehavior is
the cause of increased suspension and expulsion rates, but the
62
data does not bear that notion out. Data indicates that students are not misbehaving any more today than they were in
63
prior eras. With regard to the most serious misbehavior—
violence—today’s students, according to the data, are slightly
64
better behaved. Even were this not the case, violence at school
65
is but a small percentage of students’ misbehavior. Thus, an
increase in serious misbehavior cannot substantiate the increase in discipline in recent decades. The increases are just too
stark.
Instead, the increase in suspensions and expulsions is primarily a function of two phenomena: suspending students for a
broader array of behavior and adopting zero tolerance policies
toward that behavior. Today’s schools suspend students for behavior that they historically ignored or addressed through
counseling and minor punishment. Until the last two decades,
expulsion and suspension were largely reserved for major in66
fractions. Today, schools suspend and expel students for al-

62. See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 18, at 71; Majd, supra note 60, at
364–65.
63. See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 18, at 71; Majd, supra note 60, at
364–65.
64. ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 60, at 10; see also Majd, supra
note 60, at 367.
65. JILL F. DEVOE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY: 2004, at 6–13 (2004),
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2005/2005002.pdf; LLOYD D. JOHNSTON ET AL., INST.
FOR SOC. RESEARCH, UNIV. OF MICH., MONITORING THE FUTURE: QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES FROM THE NATION’S HIGH SCHOOL SENIORS 113 (2005),
http://monitoringthefuture.org/datavolumes/2005/2005dv.pdf.
66. See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 18, at 71; cf. Brent E. Troyan,
Note, The Silent Treatment: Perpetual In-School Suspensions and the Educa-
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most anything: truancy, cheating, running in the hall, dress
67
code violations, foul language, and disrespect. Just recently, a
high school student in Indiana was expelled for the school year
for his juvenile attempt at creative language use on the internet—inserting the “f-word” multiple times in a single sentence—even though he did not direct his language toward any68
one and it was done in the middle of the night from home.
Suspension and expulsion under like circumstances are not
the acts of rogue administrators. Rather, various state statutes
have turned minor misbehaviors into grounds for suspension
69
and expulsion. As a result, ninety-five percent of suspensions
today are for what schools themselves characterize as “disrup70
tive” or “willful” behavior. Some schools and states are willing
to suspend or expel students based on one instance of minor
71
misbehavior, whereas others rely on something akin to a
72
“three strikes and you’re out” approach to minor misbehavior.

tion Rights of Students, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1637, 1641–42 (2003) (stating that expulsion and suspension sanctions are not reserved for major infractions).
67. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900 (West 2014) (including
“[c]ommitted an obscene act or engaged in habitual profanity or vulgarity” and
“[d]isrupted school activities or otherwise willfully defied the valid authority of
supervisors, teachers, administrators, school officials, or other school personnel engaged in the performance of their duties” as expellable offenses); Sandra
Tan, In Buffalo, NY, Students No Longer Suspended for Minor Misbehavior,
BREAKING SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www
.breakingthepipeline.org/2013/04/25/in-buffalo-students-no-longer-suspended
-for-minor-misbehavior.
68. Austin Carroll, Indiana High School Student, Expelled for Tweeting
Profanity, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 25, 2012, 1:32 PM), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/25/austin-carroll-indiana-hi_n_1378250.html.
69. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-11-18.1 (2014); S.C. CODE ANN. § 5963-210 (2014); see also Joy Resmovits, School Discipline Changes Urged in
Federal Complaint Against Dallas Truancy System, HUFFINGTON POST (June
6, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/12/school
-discipline-changes-dallas-truancy_n_3423820.html (reporting that three absences in four weeks is a class C misdemeanor in Texas).
70. Arne Duncan, U.S. Sec’y of Educ., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Rethinking
School Discipline (Jan. 8, 2014), available at http://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/
rethinking-school-discipline; Jolon McNeil, Zero Tolerance, Zero Opportunity,
JUV. JUST. PROJECT OF LA., http://jjpl.org/zero-tolerance-zero-opportunity (last
visited Dec. 18, 2014); cf. LOSEN & MARTINEZ, supra note 9, at 8 (discussing
the increase in the use of suspensions at every level of education).
71. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 18, at 71–72.
72. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-11-18.1 (2014) (stating that three instances of classroom “disruption” is a basis for expulsion); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 59-63-210 (establishing persistent disruption as a basis to expel); Blumenson
& Nilsen, supra note 18, at 71; Rokeach & Denvir, supra note 19, at 280–82.
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Statutes and school district policies have also restricted the
discretion of administrators in determining whether suspension
73
and expulsion are warranted. Suspension and expulsion are
74
now mandatory in many instances. This mandatory approach,
or “zero tolerance,” is almost uniform in regard to serious behavior. Ninety-one percent of schools have adopted zero tolerance toward weapons, and just short of ninety percent have
75
adopted zero tolerance toward drugs and alcohol. Those percentages may seem reasonable if by ‘weapon’ one means a gun,
or by ‘drugs’ one means marijuana. But schools have given
those terms expansive meaning, ensnaring students who either
do not pose a danger to anyone or have not engaged in behavior
that an objective observer would perceive as a violation of the
schools’ policies. Consider the suspension or expulsion of the
middle school student who brought an over-the-counter medicine to school to treat an illness, the six year old who ate his
lunch with his beloved cub scout tool, and the girl whose first
76
aid kit in her car contained a small knife. Even if safety demanded zero tolerance for the possession of more serious items,
the rationale would not follow for minor behavior, which accounts for the overwhelming percentage of suspensions and expulsions.
C. THE RATIONALE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF ZERO TOLERANCE
AND HARSH DISCIPLINE
The motivations and theories behind the zero tolerance and
harsh discipline policies are complex. An individual state, district, or school can hold multiple different theories and motiva77
tions. This makes speaking of zero tolerance in monolithic
terms problematic. But on the whole, a few major motivations
are at play to varying degrees, depending on the locale or administrator. Blumenson and Nilsen identify three major goals
73. See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 18, at 71–72.
74. Id. at 69–72.
75. CATHERINE Y. KIM ET AL., THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE: STRUCTURING LEGAL REFORM 79 (2010) (stating that 87% of schools have zero tolerance for alcohol and 88% have zero tolerance for drugs, and that 79% of
schools adopt zero tolerance toward violence).
76. See, e.g., John J. Garman & Ray Walker, The Zero-Tolerance Discipline Plan and Due Process: Elements of a Model Resolving Conflicts Between
Discipline and Fairness, 1 FAULKNER L. REV. 289, 308–09 (2010); J. Kevin
Jenkins & John Dayton, Students, Weapons, and Due Process: An Analysis of
Zero Tolerance Policies in Public Schools, 171 EDUC. L. REP. 13, 14–15 (2003).
77. See, e.g., ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 60, at 11–12, 14, 25–26.
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of zero tolerance: deterring misbehavior, incapacitating disruptive and dangerous students, and ensuring consistent responses to misbehavior, with an aim toward reducing racial dispari78
ties.
Each of these goals is presumptively legitimate. To be effective, schools must minimize disruptive behavior and maintain safety. Without an ordered and safe environment, neither
the misbehaving nor behaving students will fully benefit from
the substantive curriculum. If misbehaving students are susceptible to deterrence, some form of negative consequence is
one way of achieving order. Finally, consistent and unambiguous responses to misbehavior can further equitable discipline
both within and between demographic groups. Zero tolerance,
however, has not achieved any of these ends. This alone, of
course, does not render zero tolerance unconstitutional under
prevailing standards, but the efficacy of zero tolerance is important background for this Article’s subsequent constitutional
analysis.
Data indicates that harsh discipline and zero tolerance
have resulted in the exclusion of more students without actual79
ly deterring or improving student behavior. If zero tolerance
were an effective deterrent, one would expect suspensions and
expulsions to fall rather than rise. Instead, nuanced analysis
indicates that overly harsh discipline simply begets more disci80
pline, rather than deterring the behavior that leads to it. Excluding a student makes it more likely that the student will be
81
excluded again, but overly harsh discipline also negatively affects the overall school environment. Students who attend
schools with higher rates of suspension and expulsion perceive
82
their environment to be less safe and more chaotic. This perception is an outgrowth not of higher rates of violence and mis78. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 18, at 75–87.
79. See, e.g., ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 60, at 14–15, 17.
80. See, e.g., Bowditch, supra note 51, at 498–99; Costenbader & Markson,
supra note 51, at 71.
81. See Bowditch, supra note 51, at 498–99; Costenbader & Markson, supra note 51, at 71.
82. See James Earl Davis & Will J. Jordan, The Effects of School Context,
Structure, and Experiences on African-American Males in Middle and High
Schools, 63 J. NEGRO EDUC. 570, 585 (1994); Russell J. Skiba & M. Karega
Rausch, Zero Tolerance, Suspension, and Expulsion: Questions of Equity and
Effectiveness, in HANDBOOK OF CLASSROOM MANAGEMENT: RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 1063, 1072 (Carolyn M. Evertson & Carol S.
Weinstein eds., 2006), available at http://www.indiana.edu/~equity/docs/Zero_
Tolerance_Effectiveness.pdf.
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behavior, but of the harsh response to that behavior. Among
otherwise similarly situated schools, those with more punitive
and rigid discipline approaches have the worst educational en83
84
vironments and lowered academic achievement. In other
words, the ultimate goal of order—learning and achievement—
is undermined. As Richard Arum’s study reveals, while students can and do respect discipline and order, they perceive it
85
as random and unfair when it becomes too strict. At that
point, students become distrustful of authority, and many rebel
86
against the perceived unfairness.
Those committed to zero tolerance might counter that,
even if harsh discipline does not deter misbehavior, it serves
the important goal of incapacitating students when they misbehave. This point, however, is of limited assistance in defending zero tolerance on the whole. First, incapacitation as a legitimate goal relates to dangerous or seriously disruptive
students. Disruptive students do not warrant or need incapacitation; they need behavioral improvement. At some point, student misbehavior is sufficiently trivial that a school could not
claim that incapacitating the student serves any rational purpose. Without defining precisely where that line is, it suffices to
say that only a small portion of school exclusions are in re87
sponse to danger or serious disruption. Moreover, as to lowlevel disruptions, studies show that after a school excludes one
disruptive student another student will tend to take his place
88
or, at least, a student will be perceived as having done so, par83. M. Karega Rausch & Russell J. Skiba, The Academic Cost of Discipline: The Relationship Between Suspension/Expulsion and School Achievement 24–25 (Apr. 2005) (paper presented at the American Educational Research Association Conference, Montreal, Canada) (on file with author),
available at http://www.indiana.edu/~atlantic/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/
Academic-Cost-of-School-Discipline.pdf.
84. Linda M. Raffaele Mendez et al., School Demographic Variables and
Out-of-School Suspension Rates: A Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis of a
Large, Ethnically Diverse School District, 39 PSYCHOL. SCHS. 259, 270–71
(2002).
85. RICHARD ARUM, JUDGING SCHOOL DISCIPLINE: THE CRISIS OF MORAL
AUTHORITY 34 (2003).
86. See id.; see also Paul M. Bogos, “Expelled. No Excuses. No Exceptions.”—Michigan’s Zero Tolerance Policy in Response to School Violence:
M.C.L.A. Section 380.1311, 74 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 357, 381 (1997) (stating
that zero tolerance “and similar measures—often harden delinquent behavior
patterns, alienate troubled youths from the schools, and foster distrust” (internal quotation mark omitted)).
87. See Skiba & Rausch, supra note 82, at 1069–70.
88. Cf. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 18, at 81 (stating that the statis-
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ticularly in a school with a negative climate. Taken to its extreme, using incapacitation to address minor disruptions could
lead a school to exclude students until there are almost none
left to teach, a result plainly inconsistent with a school’s constitutional and statutory duty to deliver public education. In
short, incapacitation may be a legitimate disciplinary goal, but
it only justifies a small slice of school exclusion. The rest of
school exclusions must rely on some other justification.
The remaining justification for zero tolerance—eliminating
inconsistent and biased application of discipline—falls short as
well. Rather than shrink the gap in exclusion rates between
89
minorities and whites, zero tolerance has expanded it. Minorities tend to be disproportionately referred to the “office” for
punishment for subjective misbehavior, like noise, disruption,
and disrespect; whites tend to be disproportionately referred for
objective behavior, like smoking, leaving without permission,
90
and vandalism. Prior to zero tolerance, most schools already
91
took a harsh approach to these objective misbehaviors. The
variation existed in the response to more subjective and less se92
rious behaviors. Thus, the practical effect of zero tolerance in
many schools was to increase the punishment for those behaviors for which minorities were disproportionately cited.
The flaw is that zero tolerance focuses on the wrong level of
the decision-making process. It ignores classroom bias and the
differential response to student misbehavior, which are the
primary sources of racial disparities in discipline, not the prin93
cipal’s office. All zero tolerance has done is to ensure that the-

tics do not significantly show that removing troublesome students from the
classroom reduces disruptions or enhances safety).
89. See e.g., KIM ET AL., supra note 75, at 2 (stating that, for example,
black students are three times more likely to be suspended than white students).
90. Russell J. Skiba et al., The Color of Discipline: Sources of Racial and
Gender Disproportionality in School Punishment, 34 URBAN REV. 317, 332
(2002), available at http://www.indiana.edu/~equity/docs/ColorofDiscipline
2002.pdf.
91. See KAFKA, supra note 11, at 17, 46.
92. Cf. ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, A REAL FIX: THE GUN-FREE WAY TO
SCHOOL SAFETY 16 (2013), available at http://b.3cdn.net/advancement/
2739bdc85740f69645_pwm6bck09.pdf (discussing some of the types of subjective infractions zero tolerance policies may punish); ADVANCEMENT PROJECT,
supra note 60, at 13–14 (same).
93. LOSEN & MARTINEZ, supra note 9, at 2; Skiba et al., supra note 90, at
317.

BLACK_5fmt

2015]

1/25/2015 1:21 PM

ZERO TOLERANCE

841

se biased referrals to the principals are followed by harsh discipline.
II. THE COURTS’ GRAND CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERVENTION AND SILENT WITHDRAWAL FROM
SCHOOL DISCIPLINE
A. THE GOALS OF GOSS V. LOPEZ
The Supreme Court’s first major intervention in school dis94
cipline was in 1975 in Goss v. Lopez. In Goss, the Court held
that due process protections apply to the suspension and expul95
sion of students. Before a school can deprive a student of his
right to education, it must afford the student notice of the basis
upon which he is to be punished and an opportunity to re96
spond. Today, this holding appears so obvious and unobtrusive that Goss appears mundane in retrospect. At the time,
however, education was confronting a crisis, of which discipline
was a part, and the particular outcome in Goss was not preordained.
Many today forget that Goss was decided within a much
larger context than just discipline. The decision came on the
heels of an expansive period of school desegregation and rapid97
ly developing law. As African Americans and whites came into
greater contact, tensions developed. In many districts, the outlet for that tension was discipline policy, through which biased
98
actors indirectly resisted desegregation and acted upon bias.
Immediately following Goss, J. Harvie Wilkinson wrote, “Goss
ultimately represents more of a sequel to Brown v. Board of
Education than to the free speech cases. If in Brown the racial
94.
95.
96.
97.

419 U.S. 565 (1975).
Id. at 582–83.
Id. at 581.
See generally GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS
PROJECT, BROWN AT 50: KING’S DREAM OR PLESSY’S NIGHTMARE? (2004) (detailing the rapid rise of school integration during the 1970s). School integration did not begin in earnest until Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and the Court subsequently articulated the details of desegregation. See,
e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
98. S. REG’L COUNCIL & ROBERT F. KENNEDY MEM’L, THE STUDENT
PUSHOUT: VICTIM OF CONTINUED RESISTANCE TO DESEGREGATION, at ix
(1973); U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FULFILLING THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF
THE LAW: DESEGREGATION OF THE NATION’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 47–50 (1976)
[hereinafter FULFILLING THE LETTER].
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question was very much on the surface, in Goss it lay not very
99
far below.” The underlying purpose of Goss was to “vindicate
the promise of Brown . . . . [and, through hearings,] help relieve
racial tensions by enhancing the appearance of evenhanded
100
discipline.”
The five Justices in the Goss majority perceived their deci101
sion as delivering a monumental victory for discipline reform;
the four dissenters characterized it as a monumental mis102
take. The disagreement centered on competing theories of
education and discipline, rather than the process itself. In
Brown-like fashion, the Goss majority focused on justifying intervention in discipline, which it did through educational goals
and theories, and offered only a vague and minimal explanation
103
of the particular process it was justifying. The first step for
the majority was simply to identify a constitutional basis upon
which to intervene. The majority held that Ohio’s compulsory
education statute vested students with a property right in edu104
cation that triggered due process.
At the time, this analytic step was enormous. The Court’s
other two most significant education rights decisions—Brown v.
105
106
Board of Education and San Antonio v. Rodriguez —had
treated education as a contingent right. Brown had emphasized
107
the importance of education but refrained from declaring it a
108
fundamental or vested property right. The Court in Rodriguez explicitly held that education was not a fundamental
109
right. The Goss dissenters, likewise, would have emphasized
that education was not a fundamental right and that the state
110
was free to make the statutory right conditional. Thus, the

99. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Goss v. Lopez: The Supreme Court As School
Superintendent, 1975 SUP. CT. REV. 25, 30 (1975).
100. Id. at 32.
101. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583–84 (1975).
102. Id. at 585–86 (Powell, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 580, 582 (majority opinion).
104. Id. at 576.
105. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
106. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
107. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
108. Id. (indicating that equal protection applies to education only when
“the state has undertaken to provide it”).
109. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37.
110. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 587 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“The
Court . . . disregards the basic structure of Ohio law in posturing this case as if
Ohio had conferred an unqualified right to education, thereby compelling the
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majority’s recognition of a vested right in education and the
protections of due process marked a new doctrinal era for education and discipline.
Beyond the predicate questions of whether an education
right exists and due process applies, the majority itself was
conflicted, with the practicalities and pedagogy of education
weighing heavily on its analysis. The Court’s concern with fair
discipline results required some level of process to avoid “erroneous” outcomes, but the Court emphasized that discipline is
about more than just punishing students for substantiated
111
misbehavior. The majority and the dissent agreed that discipline is a pedagogical tool whereby schools teach students good
behavior, good citizenship, consequences, and personal respon112
sibility. The Court assumed that schools’ motivation for discipline is largely benevolent, rather than punitive, and designed
113
to serve the interests of the disciplined student. Thus, the
Court was cautious about requiring procedures that would, as
it saw it, undermine the educational function of discipline and
114
transform it into an overly adversative process.

school authorities to conform to due process procedures in imposing the most
routine discipline.”).
111. Id. at 580–84 (majority opinion).
112. Id. at 580 (“Some modicum of discipline and order is essential if the
educational function is to be performed. Events calling for discipline are frequent occurrences and sometimes require immediate, effective action. Suspension is considered not only to be a necessary tool to maintain order but a valuable educational device.”); id. at 592 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“Education in any
meaningful sense includes the inculcation of an understanding in each pupil of
the necessity of rules and obedience thereto. This understanding is no less important than learning to read and write. One who does not comprehend the
meaning and necessity of discipline is handicapped not merely in his education
but throughout his subsequent life. In an age when the home and church play
a diminishing role in shaping the character and value judgments of the young,
a heavier responsibility falls upon the schools . . . . The lesson of discipline is
not merely a matter of the student’s self-interest in the shaping of his own
character and personality; it provides an early understanding of the relevance
to the social compact of respect for the rights of others. The classroom is the
laboratory in which this lesson of life is best learned. Mr. Justice Black
summed it up: ‘School discipline, like parental discipline, is an integral and
important part of training our children to be good citizens—to be better citizens.’” (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
524 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting))).
113. See id. at 580 (majority opinion).
114. Id. at 583 (“[F]ormalizing the suspension process and escalating its
formality and adversary nature may not only make it too costly as a regular
disciplinary tool but also destroy its effectiveness as part of the teaching process.”).
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Both the majority and dissent conceptualized discipline as
pedagogical and benevolent, but parted ways on the weight to
afford this conceptualization. The majority did not believe this
was a basis upon which to entirely exempt discipline from due
115
process procedures, whereas the dissent argued that requiring any type of procedure would undermine the pedagogy of
116
discipline. The majority, however, was sufficiently sympathetic toward the dissent’s position that it articulated due pro117
which allowed
cess requirements in vague broad terms,
schools to retain flexibility in administering discipline. Regardless of which side was correct, this internal debate reveals that
the imposition of discipline in Goss was about far more than the
process itself. Goss was premised on a set of judicial and educational goals—protecting students’ rights, accuracy in results,
pedagogically effective discipline, and non-adversarial discipline.
B. THE FLAWS OF GOSS V. LOPEZ
The Court’s opinion in Goss has fallen far short of its goals.
The flaw in Goss is not that it intervened in discipline, but that
its intervention was too weak. The Court relied on assumptions
that later proved false and failed to articulate due process
standards that were rigorous enough to stand the test of practicality. The Court was likely aware of the latter point and may
very well have intended to issue more forceful subsequent opinions, rolling out progressive doctrine over time. But solutions in
subsequent opinions never came. If the Court never intended a
subsequent opinion, the Goss dissenters have been proven correct, insofar as the majority’s half-measure solution for disci118
pline may be worse than no solution at all. Regardless, the
doctrine that Goss did announce remains in effect and demands
the further development that never occurred.
The following subsections focus on three major flaws in
Goss. The first section reveals the Court’s assumption that
those administering discipline would necessarily act with benevolence toward students and in the disciplined students’ best
interests. The second section analyzes the particular due process standard that the Court adopted in Goss, critiquing its
lack of substantive limits on school officials who do not act be115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 579–80.
Id. at 585 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 583–84 (majority opinion).
See id. at 597–99 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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nevolently or thoughtfully toward students. The third section
discusses the inability of the Court to evolve and cure the vague
doctrine in Goss due to changes in the Court’s composition,
which the majority in Goss should have foreseen.
1. The Assumption of the “Benevolent Administrator”
The first flaw in Goss was the Court’s assumption that the
non-adversarial theory of education would persist naturally,
notwithstanding the Court’s intervention. The Court wrote,
“[W]e do not believe that we have imposed procedures on school
disciplinarians which are inappropriate in a classroom setting.
Instead we have imposed requirements which are, if anything,
less than a fair-minded school principal would impose upon
119
himself in order to avoid unfair suspensions.” Thus, the Court
expected that administrators would implement and apply due
process with good faith and benevolence.
The Court may have wanted to have its cake and eat it too
on this score. The notion that most schools would interpret
Goss as practically inconsequential is inconsistent with the
Court’s notion that Goss was monumental. Even if Goss imposed only a minimal burden, the perception from the class120
room and principal’s office was far different. The burden—
whatever its weight—fell solely on teachers and administrators, and they would henceforth be accountable in court for car121
rying it. Being naturally benevolent, which the Court assumed on the part of schools, is far different than being held
accountable for benevolence by the legal system. This reality
colored schools’ perception of what might have otherwise been a
122
minimal burden.
Subsequent data suggests that Goss’s mandate incited
school-level resistance to thoughtful and robust procedures,
123
and incentivized process for the sake of process. Today, school
officials and teachers perceive the disciplinary process as ad-

119. Id. at 583 (majority opinion).
120. ARUM, supra note 85, at 30.
121. Id.
122. Id.; see also Chouhoud & Zirkel, supra note 17, at 353 (“Last year, upon the thirtieth anniversary of the Supreme Court’s decision in Goss v. Lopez,
the then-general counsel of the National School Boards Association decried the
expansion of Goss from a ‘three minute give and take’ to the ‘paralysis’ of public school discipline.”).
123. ARUM, supra note 85, at 30.
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124

versarial, which alters their entire approach. Thirty years after Goss, the general counsel of the National School Boards Association concluded that due process had “create[d] a paralysis”
125
in schools and teachers, who now “fumbl[e] away through
their daily disciplinary dealings with students wondering and
126
working at their peril.” School personnel indicate that they
believe Goss constrains their discretion, imposes unnecessary
127
procedural and operational burdens, and places them at odds
128
with students. Both process and the students have become
129
the enemy. Schools’ response has been to routinize process to
130
produce the favored result. Rather than a deliberative or collaborative process aimed at accuracy, justice, or educational
lessons, due process is the routine through which a school must
131
run.
Richard Arum argues that, by granting students legal recourse for deprivations of process, Goss placed students and
schools in adversarial positions and undermined the moral authority of schools, the latter of which he cites as a primary evil
132
of Goss. An equally plausible explanation is that school officials overreacted to Goss and failed to appreciate the significant
discretion Goss reserved for them. Thus, the Court is not entirely to blame. Regardless, the practical result is the same: the
disciplinary process is no longer the educational tool the Court
imagined. Schools now focus on documenting process rather

124. Id.; cf. Jessica Falk, Overcoming a Lawyer’s Dogma: Examining Due
Process for the “Disruptive Student,” 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 457, 468 (2003)
(discussing how students perceive traditional due process hearings as adversarial, with school personnel against them).
125. Julie Underwood, The 30th Anniversary of Goss v. Lopez, 198 EDUC. L.
REP. 795, 802 (2005).
126. Id. at 803.
127. Chouhoud & Zirkel, supra note 17, at 357 & n.23.
128. See Betsy Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship: The Conflict Between Authority and Individual Rights in the Public School, 95 YALE L.J.
1647, 1672 (1986) (stating that the legalization of dispute resolution in the
schools potentially sets students and teachers up as adversaries rather than
as participants in the learning process).
129. See ARUM, supra note 85, at 30 (stating that by the late 1970s, fiftynine percent of teachers indicated that court decisions had hampered schools).
See generally Falk, supra note 124, at 468 (discussing the adversarial nature
of traditional due process hearings); Levin, supra note 128, at 1672 (same).
130. See generally KAFKA, supra note 11, at 6 (discussing the bureaucratization and centralization of discipline in response to Goss).
131. ARUM, supra note 85, at 5.
132. Id. at 4.
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than affording meaningful process, thereby undermining the
pedagogical use of discipline.
2. Indefinite and Substanceless Standards
The Court’s concern with burdening the assumed “fairminded” administrator led to a second major flaw: a decision
devoid of meaningfully enforceable substance. To protect both
students’ rights and the educational value of discipline, the
Court in Goss needed to do more than announce grand theories
133
and principles. Beyond the basic idea of affording notice and
response, Goss is a relatively hollow decision that ignored key
134
issues and left others obviously open. The Court in Goss conceptualized due process in discipline as an investigation into
whether discipline is warranted, with the goal being to reach
135
the correct result. If by “warranted” or “correct,” the Court
meant that a student has engaged in prohibited behavior, the
broad dictates of Goss are theoretically sufficient to achieve
that end. The Court’s language in Goss—“determin[ing] wheth136
er the misconduct has occurred” —is certainly susceptible to
this narrow meaning.
Determining that an individual has engaged in some particular act, however, does not automatically answer the question of whether a particular punishment is normatively or constitutionally warranted. The latter question also requires a
substantive evaluation of a student’s behavior and the range of
137
available punishments. The Court in Goss makes no mention
of a student’s culpability as an inquiry of due process, nor does
it indicate that a school might need to justify some punishments, particularly harsh ones, with a meaningful, important,
or substantial justification. The lack of specificity on this point
is not per se problematic. The Court’s “fair-minded” administrator would consider a student’s culpability and the necessity
of discipline. But where the fair-minded administrator is not

133. Josie Foehrenbach Brown, Developmental Due Process: Waging a Constitutional Campaign To Align School Discipline with Developmental
Knowledge, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 929, 959 (2009); Wilkinson, supra note 99, at 73.
134. ELLEN JANE HOLLINGSWORTH ET AL., SCHOOL DISCIPLINE: ORDER AND
AUTONOMY 127 (1984); Brown, supra note 133, at 957; Wilkinson, supra note
99, at 29–30.
135. Brown, supra note 133, at 994.
136. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975).
137. See generally Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U. L.
REV. 1, 4–5 (1992).
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involved, procedural consideration of these points is essential,
as it is the only thing left to protect the student.
Even the “fair-minded” administrator is not immune from
the problem, particularly when process has been routinized and
offered primarily for the sake of process. If culpability and necessity are not part of the routinized consideration, they can
easily go unaddressed. Thus, whether the administrator is malevolent or benevolent, the Court’s failure to articulate a substantive limitation on school discipline seriously risks the possibility that the Court’s broad goals and principles will ring
138
completely hollow where they are needed most. At best, the
issues of culpability and appropriate discipline are left open by
Goss. At worst, they are irrelevant because the only objective of
the process is to assess whether a particular behavior oc139
curred. The latter would leave schools free to turn discipline
codes into strict liability codes, in which intent and culpability
are irrelevant.
The Court’s distinction between long- and short-term suspensions, however, did hint at some underlying substantive
limits. With the most severe penalties, the Court indicated
140
schools should be more careful. “Longer suspensions or expulsions for the remainder of the school term, or permanently,
141
may require more formal procedures.” But the Court did not
explore what more formal procedures might look like or a
standard by which to gauge them. In this respect, the Court
142
was not per se committed to any formal procedures, which
leaves the opinion dangerously insufficient from the perspective of students. Once long-term punishment is at issue, the assumption of benevolence by an administrator almost necessarily vanishes. The school’s purpose is to exclude a perceived
threat or problem (i.e., the student), not to use discipline as a
143
teaching tool. Thus, while the notion of heightened process
138. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 374 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
139. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 574.
140. Id. at 584.
141. Id.
142. Lower courts treat eleven days as a per se trigger. See, e.g., Doe ex rel.
Doe v. Todd Cnty. Sch. Dist., 625 F.3d 459, 462 (8th Cir. 2010).
143. See Brooke Grona, School Discipline: What Process Is Due? What Process Is Deserved?, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 233, 233 (2000) (“Perhaps it is as disciplinarian that the school most delicately balances its roles: as state, as quasiparent, as police, and as educator. But in its goal to achieve safety on the campus, the school loses its concern for educating the student.”); Levin, supra note
128, at 1672.

BLACK_5fmt

2015]

1/25/2015 1:21 PM

ZERO TOLERANCE

849

for longer suspensions might hint at substantive limits, the
Court’s opinion is not even sufficient to protect procedural
rights, much less substantive ones.
3. Goss as the First Step in an Unfolding Judicial Project That
Never Came To Be
That the Court would announce important constitutional
doctrine, leave it intentionally vague, and never refine it is
problematic. The Court was either naively optimistic about
what Goss would achieve or intended it to be but the first in a
144
series of progressively evolving discipline decisions. A progressive approach would have had pragmatic value. The Court
in Brown v. Board of Education, for instance, took this approach, initially saying nothing as to the meaning of desegrega145
tion, nor when and how schools would achieve it. Moving too
far too fast might have overstretched the Court’s institutional
capacities, undermining both effective desegregation and the
146
Court’s authority. Thus, the Court waited over a decade to issue the decisions that offered the substantive specifics of deseg147
The contentiousness of disciplinary due process
regation.
pales in comparison to desegregation, but a similar approach in
Goss would have made sense given that the Court was reforming a major aspect of education that was intertwined with
school culture and bias.
That approach, by necessity, would have required subsequent action by the Court. Without later decisions like Green v.
148
County School Board of New Kent to impose affirmative duties and identify specific criteria to measure compliance, Brown
would have had very little effect on the education of students.
In fact, during the decade between Brown and Green, actual
desegregation was non-existent. Less than two percent of chil149
dren in the South attended desegregated schools. The same
principle applies to Goss. The broad concept of due process im144. See generally Wilkinson, supra note 99 (discussing the issues with and
limitations of the Goss decision, as perceived in 1975).
145. DEREK W. BLACK, EDUCATION LAW: EQUALITY, FAIRNESS, AND REFORM 29 (2013).
146. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (2d ed. Yale Univ.
Press, 1986).
147. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1
(1971); Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
148. 391 U.S. 430 (1971).
149. FULFILLING THE LETTER, supra note 98, at 6.
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bedded in Goss risked irrelevance unless it was followed by a
150
hypothetical Doe v. School District. Doe never came because
the Court either naively thought benevolent administrators
eliminated the need or misjudged the times, assuming that
those supporting liberal school ideology would remain the ma151
jority on the Court. Regardless, in retrospect, Goss is seriously flawed in its lack of detailed and contextualized due process
152
standards.
The lack of specificity in Goss left its broad principles subject to retraction. The basic holding of Goss—that due process
applies to educational deprivations and requires notice and an
opportunity to respond—has never been questioned, but tangentially related cases have undermined and curtailed its impact. In fact, the four Goss dissenters later became the controlling majority in cases that practically and ideologically
153
vindicated their Goss dissent. Just one month after Goss, the
154
Court decided Wood v. Strickland. The primary issue was
whether school board members were immune from damages for
155
due process violations. The majority held that school board
members who knew or should have known they were violating
156
due process were subject to damages. The same four Justices
who had dissented in Goss dissented again in Wood, rejecting
that holding and questioning the normative educational goals
157
the majority was espousing. Justice Powell, the author of
158
both the Goss and Wood dissents, objected to any judicial in-

150. See generally Brown, supra note 133, at 930–31 (discussing the
Court’s failure to follow Goss with subsequent reinforcing decisions).
151. I say “naively” because, at the time of Goss, the Court had already decided deeply divided new cases placing limits on school desegregation. See,
e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (five opinions); Keyes v. Sch.
Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (five opinions, with Justice
White abstaining).
152. Even if the Court did not flesh out every detail of due process, any details would have made a John Doe case less necessary and, equally important,
would have guarded the case against the indirect retraction that followed.
153. See e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 652 (1977).
154. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
155. Id. at 314.
156. Id. at 322.
157. Id. at 327–31 (Powell, J., dissenting); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584
(1975) (Powell, J., dissenting).
158. Wood, 420 U.S. at 327 (Powell, J., dissenting); Goss, 419 U.S. at 584
(Powell, J., dissenting).
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tervention that might alter the delivery of discipline, remarking that “[i]n view of today’s decision significantly enhancing
the possibility of personal liability, one must wonder whether
qualified persons will continue in the desired numbers to vol160
unteer for service in public education.”
The Court in Wood also addressed whether, as a factual
161
matter, a due process violation had occurred. In Wood, a
school regulation prohibited the use or possession of intoxicat162
ing beverages. No question arose as to whether the school
had followed proper procedures in punishing the students. Rather, the question was whether the school could define “intoxicating beverage” itself or was bound by the state’s statutory
definition of “intoxicating liquor,” which mattered because the
163
students’ beverage did not meet the statutory definition. The
court of appeals applied the statutory definition and reversed
the punishment. The Supreme Court reinstated the punishment, finding that the record established that the school had
164
adopted its own definition and had the authority to do so.
On these points, Wood is rather unremarkable. The case
simply held that school officials, like other state officials, are
subject to suit, but endowed with discretion in adopting and
administering their own regulatory code. What was striking
was the Court’s hostility to the lower court’s review of the
165
case. The Court wrote:
It is not the role of the federal courts to set aside decisions of school
administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion. Public high school students do have substantive
and procedural rights while at school. But § 1983 does not extend the
right to relitigate in federal court evidentiary questions arising in
school disciplinary proceedings or the proper construction of school
regulations. . . . [P]ublic education . . . relies necessarily upon the discretion and judgment of school administrators and school board
members, and § 1983 was not intended to be a vehicle for federalcourt corrections of errors in the exercise of that discretion which do

159. Wood, 420 U.S. at 331 (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s good faith immunity analysis imposed a higher standard on school officials).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 327 (majority opinion).
162. Id. at 310.
163. Id. at 324–26.
164. Id.
165. The lower court opinion also vacillated between a procedural and substantive due process review, but the Court interpreted it as based on substantive due process. Id. at 326–27.
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not rise to the level of violations of specific constitutional guaran166
tees.

The tone of this quote is hard to reconcile with the holding
in Goss, particularly since the two cases were decided a month
apart. One explanation is that, contrary to this Article’s analysis, Goss was intended as a minimalist decision, not to reform
discipline or offer meaningful protections. The hostile quote in
Wood would support that notion. It is also consistent with the
weak and flexible nature of Goss’s due process mandate and
with the Court’s failure to strengthen it later. This explanation,
however, does not explain the actual holding in Goss and its
historical significance. Wilkinson’s exploration of the overall
historical record compellingly demonstrates that the Court in
Goss was responding to underlying evidence of racially disparate practices and intentionally breaking important new doctri167
nal ground. Wading into this contested area just to offer an
advisory opinion—one that was not internally defended against
subsequent retraction by the harsh dissent—would have been a
fool’s errand that stood the chance of doing more harm than
good. More important, Goss extends new rights to students and
168
Wood makes them enforceable with monetary damages. Regardless of their practical flaws, these holdings represent concrete doctrinal expansion. Read this way, Wood does not vindicate a minimalist Goss, but is still part of a measured and
progressive roll out of Goss. For this reason, it drew the same
vigorous dissenters from Goss.
The rebuke of judicial review in Wood, nonetheless, did occur and requires further explanation. The rebuke likely had
more to do with the facts of Wood than anything else. The students had admittedly brought alcohol to school, consumed it,
given it to unsuspecting third parties, and then sought to escape liability on the technicality that the alcohol level was too
169
low to be classified as an alcoholic beverage under state law.
That the court of appeals would reverse punishment in this
context troubled the entire Court, which unanimously rejected
170
the lower court’s reinterpretation of the school’s code. While
the majority in Goss intended due process to serve educational
goals and prevent unwarranted discipline, the Court in Wood
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 326 (citations omitted).
Wilkinson, supra note 99, at 31–32.
Wood, 420 U.S. at 322.
Id. at 325–26.
Id. at 324–25.
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makes clear that it did not intend due process to serve as the
mechanism whereby courts would permit misbehaving students
to escape punishment or to seek de novo reviews of evidence
171
and school rules. In fact, intervention in this context would be
inconsistent with the Court’s theory of the benevolent administrator acting in students’ best interests. Intervention would
have also been a move toward an inherently adversarial and
legalized disciplinary process, in which courts stood on the side
of students seeking to out-argue well-intentioned school officials.
While Wood can be synthesized with Goss, Ingraham v.
172
Wright —a corporal punishment case in 1977—cannot. Ingraham marked a real shift on the Court toward the Goss and
Wood dissenters. The Court in Ingraham held that schools need
not afford students any process prior to imposing corporal pun173
The Court found the available post-punishment
ishment.
remedies under state law sufficient to protect students’
174
rights. Because Ingraham involved corporal punishment and
Goss involved suspension, Ingraham did not overrule Goss, but
the cases are logically inconsistent. A one-day suspension is
sufficient to trigger due process and require advance notice and
175
an opportunity to respond under Goss, whereas the deprivation of physical liberty in Ingraham does not. The Court’s rationale in Ingraham is straightforward and mirrors the dissent
in Goss: a pre-punishment process is burdensome and under176
mines the educational effectiveness of corporal punishment.
The Court ignored the logical inconsistency with Goss, sum177
marily distinguishing it as a case about property. The cases,
however, are inseparable because both raise the same exact
questions of educational pedagogy and disciplinary procedures.
In these respects, Ingraham marks a post facto limitation on
Goss’s doctrine and rationale.
178
In 1985 in New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Court again undermined the rationale of Goss. Because T.L.O. was a Fourth

171. Id. at 326.
172. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
173. Id. at 682.
174. Id.
175. Goss v. Lopez, 430 U.S. 565, 575–76 (1974).
176. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 680; Goss, 430 U.S. at 585–86 (Powell, J., dissenting).
177. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 674 n.43; Wood, 420 U.S. at 310.
178. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).

BLACK_5fmt

854

1/25/2015 1:21 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
179

[99:823

Amendment search case, its specific doctrine is only tangentially related to Goss. But as a practical matter, searches are
necessarily connected to due process and punishment because
searches uncover the contraband leading to discipline. Likewise, the ideological connection to Goss is strong because T.L.O.
poses the same issue of administrative flexibility in regulating
student behavior. The Court in T.L.O., however, cast aside the
idealism of Goss, making clear that any progressive agenda
that Goss might have contemplated was foreclosed. Instead,
T.L.O. reinforced the Ingraham approach.
First, the Court in T.L.O. exempted schools from the gen180
erally applicable probable cause standard, without, according
to the dissent, offering any doctrinally defensible justifica181
tion. In place of probable cause, the Court adopted the far
more permissive and malleable “reasonable suspicion” test for
182
school searches. Second, and more problematic for disciplinary pedagogy and doctrine, the Court in T.L.O. treated violations of all school rules as equivalent in terms of their ability to
183
justify a search. In other words, whether the suspicion is of
writing a dirty note or possessing cocaine, both offer an equally
compelling justification for a search. The Court in Goss, in contrast, had clearly distinguished between long- and short-term
punishments and, by implication, certain types of behavior.
184
Each warranted a different due process response. T.L.O. left
that due process principle untouched, but gave schools free
reign in the investigation that precedes the process. Minor misbehavior could subject students to the same level of privacy in185
vasion as criminal behavior. Thus, T.L.O., unlike Goss, is not
premised as a meaningful check on discipline, but a validation
of nearly unfettered investigatory authority by schools.
In sum, the line of cases necessary to reinforce and evolve
Goss never came. The precedential vacuum was filled by a line
of related cases that revisited Goss’s underlying premises. Although the cases left Goss’s holding intact, they cabined and circumscribed Goss’s impact. As a result, Goss’s final legacy fell
short of its initial promise. First, students may be due some
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 327.
Id. at 341.
Id. at 354 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 341 (majority opinion).
Id. at 341–42.
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1974).
See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342.
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process before suspension, but process is vague and not susceptible to strict enforcement. Second, the process does not apply
to discipline across the board, even punishment as severe as
“beating.” Third, schools are entitled to extensive deference in
terms of the behavioral rules they set and how they investigate
them. These three principles prevent courts from interfering
with the proper functioning of schools, but they also impede the
protection of rights that Goss indicated students have.
C. REDUCING DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS TO A SHAM
The internal flaws of Goss and the subsequent cabining of
its doctrine have resulted in due process practices that, as a
practical matter, are often reduced to a sham. Even without the
186
benefit of hindsight, Wilkinson predicted this would occur. He
wrote that the “skeletal” and “threadbare” process guaranteed
187
by Goss is “anything but searching” and “hardly . . . sufficient
188
to protect . . . against deprivation by pretext.” Absent the benevolent administrator, due process would not be “an exercise
in democracy, but more a charade which authorities play as
quickly as possible in order to reach the predetermined
189
res[u]lt.” David Kirp joined Wilkinson, concluding that, in absence of substantive protections, Goss hearings could be re190
duced to “prepunishment ceremonies.”
Donald Stone’s empirical study of schools’ due process
hearings two decades later confirms these warnings. His study
revealed wild variations in terms of what procedures schools
followed in suspension hearings, if a hearing was even held at
191
all. First, an in-person hearing before the board or hearing
192
officer only occurred fifty-three percent of the time. In urban
districts, only forty-one percent of students received an in193
person hearing. While most districts reserved the official decision to suspend for the school board or a hearing officer,
boards and school officers saw their role not as adjudicating a
deliberative process in which a student could participate, but as
186. Wilkinson, supra note 99, at 40–42.
187. Id. at 40, 42.
188. Id. at 30.
189. Id. at 72.
190. David L. Kirp, Proceduralism and Bureaucracy: Due Process in the
School Setting, 28 STAN. L. REV. 841, 842 (1976).
191. Donald H. Stone, Crime & Punishment in Public Schools: An Empirical Study of Disciplinary Proceedings, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 351, 359 (1993).
192. Id.
193. Id.
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acting upon the recommendation of its inferior officer, the prin194
cipal. Second, even when districts afforded students a hearing, they frequently failed to afford students basic notice protections or to place the burden of substantiating the charges on
195
the state. The absence of deliberative hearings and basic protections within them is counter to the “fair-minded” assessment
Goss expected, and more akin to the charades feared by Wilkinson and Kirp. It is no surprise then that Stone found that
196
students were suspended eighty-five percent of the time.
The sham-like nature of process has become so normative
that courts may not recognize it, even when it is called to their
197
attention. The Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Newsome v. Batavia
offers a prime example. Arthur Newsome was accused of pos198
sessing and selling marijuana at his high school. The only evidence presented against him was the principal’s recitation of
199
two anonymous students’ accusations. Newsome denied the
allegations and even passed a drug test, but was nonetheless
200
expelled. Newsome claimed that the district had deprived
him of sufficient process, including the right to cross-examine,
to have his attorney represent him, and to have an impartial
201
202
decision-maker. The court rejected those claims, but did
grant him relief on a single point. Through court-ordered discovery, Newsome learned that “the superintendent disclosed to
the school board, during their closed deliberations, new evidence which had not been presented during the open hear203
ing.” The court held that this violated his due process right to
204
notice.
This narrow victory, however, overlooked the flaw permeating the entire process: a single-minded intent to expel New194. See id. at 367 (finding that the disciplinary hearing ended in suspension in eighty-five percent of the cases in which the school recommended that
the student be suspended).
195. Id. at 355, 364 (indicating that 65% of students did not receive a
summary of the evidence, and 30% of hearings only required preponderance of
the evidence, while 52% required clear and convincing evidence as the standard and 18% used reasonable doubt as the standard).
196. Id. at 367.
197. 842 F.2d 920 (6th Cir. 1988).
198. Id. at 921.
199. Id. at 921–22.
200. Id. at 921.
201. Id. at 922.
202. Id. at 924–27.
203. Id. at 927.
204. Id.
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some, regardless of process. Had Newsome never sued the
school board and survived dispositive motions, he would never
have known that the school board was having ex parte conversations with the principal and gathering secret evidence. The
court in Newsome is, of course, correct that the school’s actions
deprived him of notice, but lack of notice was emblematic of an
inherently flawed and biased process. Recognizing this, Newsome’s claim focused more heavily on the denial of an impartial
decision-maker, the absence of which infected the entire process.
Newsome emphasized that his principal had been involved
in the investigation, initial recommendation, and closed door
205
discussions with the school board. The court responded that
the multi-stage involvement of a single administrator does not
206
raise due process concerns. According to the court, Newsome
failed to make the crucial showing: “that the principal and/or
superintendent possessed either a pre-existing animus towards
him, or had developed a bias because of their involvement in
207
the incident.” This response belies common sense and the
facts of the case. The principal gathered information against
Newsome, withheld some of that information, and then used it
to privately influence the final decision-maker. Newsome was
deprived of due process not simply because he lacked notice,
but because the entire school apparatus was arrayed against
him. It is hard to imagine that notice would have had any effect
on the outcome in Newsome’s hearing because the hearing did
not include serious or fair deliberation. That the board was
willing to conduct its deliberations and make its real decisions
behind a cloak reveals that the open and formal process required by Goss was a charade. Without insisting on procedures
that would limit and ferret out ex parte deliberations and partiality, a finding that Newsome’s notice rights were violated
does nothing to protect other students. Even if students sense
their process is a charade, they will have no basis to know their
notice rights, or other substantive rights, have been violated.
While Newsome is egregious, it is not anomalous. Other
courts would have rejected Newsome’s impartiality claim for
208
the same reasons. Courts also tend to be similarly dismissive
205. Id. at 926.
206. Id. at 926–27.
207. Id. at 927 n.5.
208. See generally BLACK, supra note 145, at 554–66 (reviewing Newsome
and other courts’ treatment of due process in school discipline).
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of other pleas for procedural protections, even when their absence raises normative questions about whether a disciplinary
209
hearing was meaningful or fair. States and school districts
occasionally implement more rigorous procedural protections
210
voluntarily, particularly in regard to expulsions. But where
schools do not act voluntarily, federal courts are generally un211
willing to impose any additional process. Thus, the flexible
approach articulated by Goss, in which process would vary
based upon circumstances, has come to operate in a single di212
rection: one that affords minimal process. Moreover, Stone’s
data and cases like Newsome indicate that Goss’s minimalistic
articulation of due process rights is insufficient to ensure
meaningful participation or operate as a serious check on suspension and expulsion decisions.
In The Myth of Due Process, June Rutherford explains that
there are two overriding goals of due process: meaningful participation in the decision-making process by the individual and
a substantive limitation on the state’s exercise of power against
213
the individual. Simply affording some form of process does
not necessarily accomplish these goals. In Rutherford’s words,
“the King at least must consider the [subject’s] views” and doing so requires process that affords the subject meaningful par214
ticipation. Even when the “King” affords the subject an opportunity to participate:
209. See Thomas R. Baker, Construing the Scope of Student Conduct Codes:
Recent Federal Rulings Suggest Heightened Court Scrutiny Ahead, 174 EDUC.
L. REP. 555, 575–77 (2003).
210. Perry A. Zirkel & Mark N. Covelle, State Laws for Student Suspension
Procedures: The Other Progeny of Goss v. Lopez, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 343,
350–52 (2009). Some state supreme courts and courts of appeal have applied
more pressure on due process because school finance precedent had classified
education as a fundamental or constitutional right, which would require more
rigorous process. See, e.g., State ex rel. G.S., 749 A.2d 902, 906–08 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 2000); King ex rel. Harvey-Barrow v. Beaufort Cnty. Bd. of Educ.,
704 S.E.2d 259, 260–61 (N.C. 2010); Phillip Leon M. v. Greenbrier, 484 S.E.2d
909, 911 (W. Va. 1996); In re RM, 102 P.3d 868, 872–77 (Wyo. 2004). But see
Doe v. Superintendent of Sch., 653 N.E.2d 1088, 1095–98 (Mass. 1995).
211. See BLACK, supra note 145, at 562–66.
212. As a general proposition, one might defend a minimalist approach as
consistent with Goss, but insofar as Goss offered flexibility in relationship to
circumstances, a minimalist approach is inconsistent with changes in educational circumstances following Goss. As discussed earlier, the consequences of
suspension and expulsion are far more serious today, and the right at stake is
a fundamental or constitutional one under state law. See supra notes 50–60
and accompanying text.
213. Rutherford, supra note 137, at 5.
214. Id. at 6–7.
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[I]f the governing principle is too vague, the opportunity to participate
may be meaningless. For example, King John could have adopted a
rule that all who displeased him would be fined 200 chickens. Such a
rule, however, would be too vague because those affected might not
understand what displeased him. The mere right to a hearing would
not solve the problem because the King alone would retain the power
to determine what displeased him. Hence, part of the purpose of procedural due process is to act as a mechanism to assure that the sub215
stantive legal principle is adequate.

Offering minimal or inadequate process, ironically, works
to the advantage of the state, rather than the individual, because it affords the state a chimera of legitimacy and fairness.
The very existence of process, regardless of its minimalist quality, can “validate an otherwise inadequate governing princi216
ple.” Without process that both affords meaningful participation and operates as a substantive check on the validity of the
principle by which the individual is judged, “those in power are
217
free to be arbitrary.” Because neither Goss nor any subsequent discipline case articulates a basis upon which to evaluate
the reasonableness of a school’s justification for punishment,
Goss leaves schools free to act arbitrarily. Rather than a deliberative or collaborative process, due process has become the
routine through which a school must run to achieve a prede218
termined result. So long as they do this, schools’ disciplinary
decisions are imbued with validity, and courts find they have
complied with the Constitution.
D. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS: A CLAIM NEVER FULLY
CONSIDERED
When process becomes pointless or sham-like in nature,
the solution is not necessarily more process because the problem is equally substantive. As Jane Rutherford explains, “the
procedural and substantive components of many decisions are
219
inextricably linked.” Recognizing as much, litigants subjected
to less than meaningful or fair process have sought to raise
substantive due process claims in addition to, or in place of,
procedural due process claims. Substantive due process, in theory, is the safety valve for irrational disciplinarians and those

215. Id. at 7.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See generally KAFKA, supra note 11, at 7 (discussing the bureaucratization and centralization of discipline in response to Goss).
219. Rutherford, supra note 137, at 7.
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who lack a sufficient justification for punishing or excluding
students. This strategy, however, has proved just as ineffective
as, if not more than, procedural due process claims.
The problem, like most others in school discipline, stems
from the fact that Goss did not directly address substantive due
process. The only other relevant Supreme Court precedent is
Wood v. Strickland, which included the problematic warning
that “[i]t is not the role of the federal courts to set aside decisions of school administrators which the court may view as
220
lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion.” While Goss explicitly extends procedural due process—which inherently requires
some level of rationality—and Wood extends liability for its violation, lower courts have more often disregarded these basic
holdings and interpreted Wood as foreclosing substantive due
process review. So long as a school followed some sort of process, courts have upheld discipline, no matter how severe or illogical.
The Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Ratner v. Loudoun County
221
Public Schools may demonstrate the worst example: a court
refusing to scrutinize expulsion even when both the court and
the school admit that a student poses no threat to the educa222
tional environment. Ratner, a middle school student, was
220. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975).
221. 16 F. App’x 140, 142 (4th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
222. See also Dunn v. Fairfield Cmty. High Sch. Dist. No. 225, 158 F.3d
962, 965–66 (7th Cir. 1998) (offering two sentences of substantive due process
review). In Dunn v. Fairfield, two high school students played an unauthorized guitar piece (a solo) in band class, for which the school removed the students from the class for the remainder of the year and barred them from basketball games. Under the class grading policy, the students also received “F”s
as final grades, which prevented one of the students from graduating with
honors. Id. at 963–64. While one could make a plausible argument that punishment was too harsh in relation to the behavior, the stronger argument attacks the logic and fairness of punishing students academically for behavioral
misconduct. The students did not cheat, fail to demonstrate academic competency, or anything of the sort, which would normally be the case for academic
punishment. Instead, they acted out behaviorally. Had it been treated as behavioral, the worst—but far from certain punishment—one could imagine
would have been short-term suspensions, which, ironically, would likely have
had a lesser effect on the students’ academic records. The court, however, did
not even humor their claims, characterizing them as trivial in comparison to
other substantive due process deprivations. Id. at 965–66. Its entire analysis
amounted to the statement that discipline does not violate substantive due
process “unless it is wholly arbitrary,” and here the students “freely conceded
that they had violated a school rule, that the rule was designed to preserve
discipline in the classroom and to punish student insubordination, and that
these were legitimate interests on the part of the school district.” Id. at 966.
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friends with a girl who had attempted suicide on previous occasions and, on the day in question, “told Ratner that she had
been suicidal the previous evening and had contemplated killing herself by slitting her wrists. She also told Ratner that she
inadvertently had brought a knife to school in her binder that
223
morning.” To protect her, Ratner took her binder from her
224
and placed it in his locker. Shortly thereafter, the school’s
dean became aware of the events and summoned Ratner to her
225
office, where Ratner turned over the knife. The dean indicated that “Ratner acted in what he saw as the girl’s best interest
and that at no time did Ratner pose a threat to harm anyone
with the knife,” but the assistant principal, nonetheless, sus226
pended Ratner for ten days. Four days later, the superintendent increased the punishment to an indefinite suspension, after which the school board increased the punishment to
227
expulsion for the remainder of the school year.
Ratner filed suit alleging due process, equal protection, and
Eighth Amendment violations. The lower court dismissed for
failure to state a claim, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed, writing:
The district court also concluded, correctly, that the school officials
gave Ratner constitutionally sufficient, even if imperfect, process in
the various notices and hearings it accorded him, and we agree.
However harsh the result in this case, the federal courts are not
properly called upon to judge the wisdom of a zero tolerance policy of
the sort alleged to be in place at Blue Ridge Middle School or of its
application to Ratner. Instead, our inquiry here is limited to whether
Ratner’s complaint alleges sufficient facts which if proved would show
that the implementation of the school’s policy in this case failed to
comport with the United States Constitution. We conclude that the
228
facts alleged in this case do not so demonstrate.

These four sentences are the entirety of the court’s evaluation
of Ratner’s claim. The court jumps to a conclusion without any
serious reasoning. This jump is premised on two simple but incorrect premises: (1) the provision of process, rather than its
sufficiency, is determinative for purposes of procedural due
process; and (2) substantive due process review is beyond the
scope of permissible judicial review because it requires courts
Thus, the court forewent any further scrutiny of the discipline.
223. Ratner, 16 F. App’x at 141.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 141–42.
228. Id. at 142 (citation omitted).
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to assess the rationality of discipline policy. These premises, if
correct, would render meaningless the procedural and substantive due process rights that Goss and Wood indicate students
hold.
Clearly troubled by the result in Ratner, Judge Hamilton
wrote a concurrence that suggested the rationale on which to
229
dig deeper. But Hamilton, ironically, believed the court was
without authority to do so. Hamilton wrote:
[T]he question raised by the facts of Ratner’s case is one of degree
and the law must be flexible enough so that school officials may intrude upon the right to a free appropriate public education only in the
most justifiable circumstances. Under a facts/circumstances-sensitive
examination of this case, Ratner’s nearly four-month suspension from
middle school is not justifiable. Indeed, it is a calculated overkill when
the punishment is considered in light of Ratner’s good-faith intentions
and his, at best, if at all, technical violation of the school’s policy. Suffice it to say that the degree of Ratner’s violation of school policy does
not correlate with the degree of his punishment. Certainly, the oft repeated maxim, “there is no justice without mercy” has been defiled by
the results obtained here. But alas, as the opinion for the court ex230
plains, this is not a federal constitutional problem.

This quote expresses Hamilton’s intuitive sense that the
school ought to be constrained in expelling harmless and/or innocent students, but he did not take the next step of engaging
in the legal analysis that might substantiate his sense or confirm the constitutionality of the school’s action. Rather, he, like
the majority, assumed the school’s action was beyond constitutional reproach.
No doubt, the Supreme Court in Wood strongly disapproved of the lower court’s substantive due process review, but
reading the Court’s opinion to foreclose substantive due process
review altogether is an over-interpretation. First, as discussed
earlier, the Court’s opinion in Wood primarily focused on quali231
fied immunity. Its analysis of the underlying due process violation was limited to four short paragraphs, in which the Court
did not distinguish between procedural and substantive due
232
process. The single time it used the term “due process” there
it did not modify or identify it as “substantive” or “procedur233
al.” The only use of those modifiers was to say, “Public high

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id. at 143–44 (Hamilton, J., concurring).
Id. at 143 (citation omitted).
See supra notes 155–60 and accompanying text.
See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322–26 (1975).
Id. at 323.
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school students do have substantive and procedural rights
234
while at school.”
Second, in the final section of the opinion, the Court did
distinguish between procedural and substantive due process,
but only to clarify remand instructions, not to make a doctrinal
point. The respondents had raised a procedural due process
claim before the Supreme Court and, while they had also raised
the claim below, the court of appeals did not reach a procedural
due process conclusion because it had found a substantive due
235
process violation. The Supreme Court simply pointed out that
on remand the court of appeals is free to reconsider that is236
sue.
Third, while the Court indicated that the lower court erred
in its analysis (which was apparently a substantive due process
analysis), the Court was vague as to whether the error was in
the standard of review, the substantive legal standard, or
something else. The Court began by suggesting that the lower
court’s error was in importing a sufficiency of evidence stand237
ard from criminal law into the school context, but the Court
then indicated that it need not address that issue because the
lower court had “erroneous[ly] [construed] . . . the school regu238
lation in question.” The lower court should have deferred to
239
the school district’s stated interpretation of the regulation.
Here, the implied legal principle is that districts are owed deference in their construction of discipline codes.
The fact that the lower court completely ignored the
school’s interpretation relieved the Court of any need to explain
or state what the controlling deference standard should be. Unless one assumes Wood requires complete deference under all
circumstances, the absence of a standard defining the extent of
deference owed to districts renders Wood’s holding of little assistance in subsequent adjudications. Likewise, the Court did
not reach the fundamental substantive due process question of
whether there are any limits on the regulations a district might
adopt. It simply pointed out that, under the proper construction
of the regulation, the evidence supported the charge against the
students and it is not the role of courts to conduct a new factual
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id. at 326.
Id. at 326–27.
Id. at 327.
Id. at 322–23.
Id. at 324.
Id. at 325.
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240

hearing on the merits of the punishments. In short, Wood only offered two negative directives to lower courts—do not engage in de novo interpretations of school regulations and do not
reopen the facts regarding the underlying discipline—neither of
which indicates courts should entirely refrain from reviewing
discipline and neither of which tells courts anything of the
standard of review that they should apply.
Fourth, one might argue that the Court’s reversal of the
lower court’s substantive due process holding, along with the
Court’s failure to articulate a standard, implied that substantive due process analysis does not apply to school discipline.
But that notion is irreconcilable with the Court’s explicit
statement and citation that students have “substantive and
241
procedural rights.” Equally important, substantive due pro242
cess is a generally applicable constitutional protection. It is
hard to imagine a rationale by which the Court could completely exempt a subject matter from its scrutiny. Substantive due
process review might be more deferential in some areas than
243
others, but some level of scrutiny still necessarily applies.
Even if such a rationale exists, the Court in Wood makes no
mention of it. In short, in the absence of an explicit holding
foreclosing substantive due process review in Wood, it is inappropriate for lower courts to forgo that review.
E. THE INCREASING DISENGAGEMENT OF COURTS IN DISCIPLINE
In the decades following Goss, courts have surprisingly
grown even less willing to seriously entertain discipline claims,
whether under procedural or substantive due process. Whatever one makes of a particular court’s rationale, the overall trend
has been to reject more and more student claims. Richard Arum’s study found that a student’s chance of prevailing in court
on a discipline claim in 1990 was at its lowest point since 1960
244
(a decade and a half before Goss was decided). Eight years before Goss in 1967, the probability of student victory was forty240. Id. at 326.
241. Id.
242. See generally Ronald Turner, On Substantive Due Process and Discretionary Traditionalism, 66 SMU L. REV. 841, 842–43 (2013) (discussing the
well-established concept of substantive process and the acquiescence of even
the most conservative wings of the Court).
243. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 755–65 (1997) (articulating the varying different levels of scrutiny and the contexts in which they have
been applied).
244. ARUM, supra note 85, at 88.
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245

nine percent. Less than a decade after Goss, it had fallen to
thirty-nine percent and by 1990 it was thirty-five percent—
246
lower than in any year in the study prior to Goss.
A later study by Youssef Chouhoud and Perry Zirkel revealed an even bleaker picture in more recent years. Relying on
a different methodology, they distinguished between the types
of claims students made and whether a court decision was on
247
the merits of a student’s claims. During the 1990s and 2000s,
they found that students secured conclusive victories about ten
to twenty percent of the time, while schools secured conclusive
248
victories about seventy-five percent of the time. Moreover,
student victories were more often on technical grounds rather
249
than substantive. Ironically, both studies also found that stu250
dents’ chances were worse in federal than state court.
None of this data definitively speaks to whether courts are
dismissing otherwise valid claims, but the declining chances of
success after the recognition of student rights in Goss is, at
least, curious. It is possible that plaintiffs and lower courts had
caught districts off guard by enforcing due process rights before
251
Goss explicitly recognized them, which would have elevated
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Chouhoud & Zirkel, supra note 17, at 366–68.
248. Id. at 372.
249. Id. at 377–78 (“In contrast to the steadily increasing pattern in overall
frequency, the pattern for overall outcomes on an issue by issue basis is rather
steady—and, for students, quite bleak. Indeed, the situation for plaintiffstudents is even darker than the overall PDP outcomes indicate given that: (1)
these data do not include the completely adverse results for students in the
cases where the court regarded the disciplinary action or effect as de minimis,
and (2) the comparatively few conclusive rulings in favor of the student often
yielded nominal remedies, including a remand to the school board for a new
hearing.” (footnotes omitted)).
250. See ARUM, supra note 85, at 92 (indicating that state courts are more
likely to find for student-plaintiffs than federal courts in cases where student
misbehavior did not involve political action); Chouhoud & Zirkel, supra note
17, at 372–74.
251. See, e.g., Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201, 211 (2d Cir. 1972),
overruled by Phillips v. Marsh, 687 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1982); Esteban v. Cent.
Mo. State Coll., 415 F.2d 1077, 1089 (8th Cir. 1969); DeJesus v. Penberthy,
344 F. Supp. 70, 74 (D. Conn. 1972) (discussing previous cases recognizing and
enforcing due process rights in a public-supported educational setting); Fielder
v. Bd. of Educ., 346 F. Supp. 722, 729 (D. Neb. 1972); Whitfield v. Simpson,
312 F. Supp. 889, 897 (E.D. Ill. 1970); Buck v. Carter, 308 F. Supp. 1246,
1249–50 (W.D. Wis. 1970); Vought v. Van Buren Pub. Sch., 306 F. Supp. 1388,
1392–93 (E.D. Mich. 1969); Stricklin v. Regents of Univ. of Wis., 297 F. Supp.
416, 420 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
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plaintiff victory rates. This, however, would only explain a
short-term decline in plaintiff success rates after Goss. It would
not explain why rates continued to decline in the 1980s and
1990s.
It is also possible that plaintiffs are simply filing more frivolous or poorly conceived cases, but this appears unlikely given
that the number of discipline cases filed each year has been
252
relatively constant and always been very small. The better
explanation is an increased negative judicial temperament toward discipline cases and the compounding effect of the precedent those courts set. Prior to Goss, it was not unusual for
253
courts to expect a school to justify its disciplinary action. Today, courts routinely reject claims with no more than two or
254
three lines of due process analysis.
III. THE MANDATE OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS:
ACCOUNTING FOR RELEVANT DISTINCTIONS,
INNOCENCE, INDIVIDUALIZED FACTORS, AND
DELIBERATION
Serious doctrinal consideration, rather than abdication or
concession, would reveal that zero tolerance and harsh discipline are not without meaningful constitutional limitations and
solutions. This is not to suggest that zero tolerance or harsh
discipline is per se unconstitutional. To the contrary, the Constitution does not prohibit schools from expelling students for
drugs, weapons, and the like. Nor does it prohibit schools from
suspending students under circumstances that most would
think unwise. Moreover, the Constitution does not grant courts
the authority to second-guess the reasoned and logical judgment of schools. But it does not follow, as some assume, that
schools can punish students whenever they choose for whatever
they choose. Constitutional principles and logical application of
them prohibit disciplinary practices that are lacking in reason,
logic, judgment, or justification.
252. The Arum study was based on forty-five to seventy published opinions
a year. See ARUM, supra note 85, at 52–53. The Zirkel study, because of different methodology, included less. See Chouhoud and Zirkel, supra note 17, at
363–66.
253. See, e.g., Lee v. Macon Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 490 F.2d 458, 460 (5th Cir.
1974); Ladson v. Bd. of Educ., Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 9, Hempstead, 323
N.Y.S.2d 545 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971); Jacobs v. Benedict, 316 N.E.2d 898, 901
(Ohio Ct. App. 1973).
254. See, e.g., Dunn v. Fairfield Cmty. High Sch. Dist. No. 225, 158 F.3d
962, 966 (7th Cir. 1998).

BLACK_5fmt

2015]

1/25/2015 1:21 PM

ZERO TOLERANCE

867

The locus of these principles is primarily, but not exclusively, substantive due process. Substantive due process is unfortunately one of the most controversial and least definitive areas
255
of constitutional law. As such, it has the danger of serving as
a playground through which the Court imposes any rules and
policies it likes. The Court used substantive due process to intervene repeatedly under highly suspect circumstances during
the Lochner era, articulating a “right to contract” that trumped
scores of state and federal regulations aimed at protecting the
256
poor and stabilizing the economy. The interventions were so
inconsistent that the Court appeared to be operating on
257
whims. The fear of returning to such an era has colored the
258
Court’s perception of substantive due process ever since.
Nonetheless, the Court has since relied on substantive due process to recognize (and reject) some of the most controversial
fundamental rights to come before it, such as the right to priva259
cy and abortion. At the same time, in other areas, the Court
has shied away from articulating rigorous standards that
would operate as meaningful checks on seemingly mundane
state actions, such as negligent or reckless police behavior in
260
the pursuit and detention of criminal suspects. This history
understandably dissuades lower courts from looking to substantive due process to resolve problems of school discipline.
This Article’s thesis, however, does not require courts to
wade into the politics or indefiniteness of substantive due process. No new grand theory of substantive due process is necessary for courts to limit egregious disciplinary policies. It is
enough to recognize basic existing principles that are either explicit or implicit in substantive due process and apply them to
the disciplinary policies of schools. The difficulty is that all but
a few courts have yet to seriously engage in substantive analy261
sis of school discipline. Thus, the precedent is sparse at best.
Nonetheless, schools are subject to the same Due Process
262
Clause and logic requirements as other state actors, and certain principles stretch across most all contexts. The task of the
255. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial
Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 314 (1993).
256. Rutherford, supra note 137, at 12.
257. See id. at 12–13.
258. Levinson, supra note 22, at 526.
259. Rutherford, supra note 137, at 25.
260. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 327, 332–36 (1986).
261. See supra Part II.D–E.
262. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975).
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remainder of this Article is to identify these limiting constitutional principles and logical constraints.
The following Sections identify four distinct substantive
due process principles that place limits on zero tolerance policies and harsh discipline. Section A addresses the problem of
treating dissimilar individuals as though they are the same. Of
course, all individuals are dissimilar in some respect, but when
individuals are dissimilar in respects that are of central relevance to their alleged misconduct, it is irrational to ignore
those dissimilarities. Building on Section A, Section B focuses
on innocence, demonstrating that substantive due process prohibits the state from harshly punishing individuals who (1)
have not breached the letter of the law; or (2) have not engaged
in normatively (whether morally, socially, or practically) objectionable behavior. Section C considers the innocence principle
in the context of zero tolerance policies. Section D explains that
to appropriately distinguish dissimilar individuals, avoid punishing the innocent, and reach rational results, substantive due
process requires the state to consider three factors in the context of imposing punishment: the intent of the alleged, the culpability of the alleged, and the harm caused or posed. Section
E, the fifth and final Section, further explains that the state
cannot simply feign attention to intent, culpability, and harm
by presupposing their existence (unless there is a strong basis
in experience or logic for doing so), nor can it preclude factual
deliberation of these issues.
A. TREATING SIGNIFICANTLY DISSIMILAR INDIVIDUALS THE
SAME IS IRRATIONAL
At some point, individuals are so dissimilarly situated that
it is irrational to treat them the same. Both due process and
equal protection rest on the fundamental principle that the
government must treat similarly situated individuals the same
263
way. This principle rests most obviously in equal protection
doctrine. There, equity limits differential treatment based on
immutable, illegitimate, or irrational differences between indi264
viduals. Because most of the inequities that courts have confronted in the past—racial, gender, disability, poverty, etc.—
fall easily within the framework of equal protection, litigants
and courts instinctively move to that analysis. But equal
263. Deana Pollard Sacks, State Actors Beating Children: A Call for Judicial Relief, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1165, 1217 (2009).
264. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153–54 (1938).
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treatment inheres in due process as well, as inequity operates
265
contrary to the rationality that due process requires. As such,
266
the Supreme Court in Bolling v. Sharpe held that due process
rights include the guarantee of equal treatment. The Court explained:
[T]he concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming
from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The
“equal protection of the laws” is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than “due process of law,” and, therefore, we do not imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases. But, as this
Court has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be
267
violative of due process.

For the purposes of this Article, the most important aspect
of equity in due process is not ensuring that similarly situated
individuals are treated the same, but the inverse. If treating
similarly situated students differently violates due process,
then treating dissimilarly situated students as though they are
the same also violates due process. Consider, for instance, disciplinary proceedings or policies aimed at identifying and punishing misbehaving students. It would be irrational to treat two
otherwise violent students differently simply because they wore
different colored shirts on the day in question. In the same way,
it would be irrational to treat a non-violent student and a violent student as though they were the same simply because they
both wore blue shirts on the day in question. Fortunately, the
real world belies such simple problems and examples. A single
state action may include multiple relevant factors and the definition of “similarly situated” would vary accordingly. Thus, a
more accurate statement of the equality principle forwarded
here would be that substantive due process is violated when either individuals are similarly situated in relevant respects, but
treated differently, or individuals are dissimilar in relevant respects, but treated the same.
To flesh out the foregoing further, treating dissimilar individuals the same violates due process for, at least, three related
but distinct reasons. First, putting formal equality concerns
265. Laurence Tribe refers to and analyzes equal protection and due process as a “double helix.” Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898
(2004); see also Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 318–19 (4th Cir. 2002) (pointing out that there is no hermetic line between the substantive and the procedural in due process analyses); Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124
HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (2011).
266. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
267. Id. at 499.
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aside, it is irrational to treat meaningfully dissimilar things as
though they are the same simply because they share some
268
characteristic. Both shovels and chainsaws have bladed tips
and similar curvatures at their ends, but choosing to dig a
grave with a chainsaw or cut down a mature oak tree with
shovel would be irrational under almost any circumstance one
would bother to imagine, even though one could theoretically
dig a grave or cut down a tree with either. The items are too
dissimilar in other meaningful respects for one to fashion a logic, under normal circumstances, by which to treat them the
same.
Second, it is irrational to disregard relevant circumstanc269
es. Both the similar and dissimilar treatment in the above
discipline example rest on irrelevant factors and disregard the
most relevant factor. Unless a school has a dress code, the color
of students’ clothing is an irrelevant factor in assessing student
behavior, whereas violence is relevant. But the example involved the school basing its decision on the former and ignoring
the latter. The key is the relevance of the factors ignored and
considered. To be clear, it is not always irrational to treat dissimilar people the same. In fact, it may be quite rational in certain circumstances. School teachers, for instance, are rational
in teaching students with blonde hair to read the same way
that they teach students with brown hair. But teachers are irrational if they teach dyslexic students to read in the same way
they teach non-dyslexic students. In short, irrational treatment
occurs when the treatment is disconnected from the relevant
270
characteristics that justify the treatment.
268. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982); Tigner v. Texas, 310
U.S. 141, 147 (1940); Kenneth W. Simons, The Logic of Egalitarian Norms, 80
B.U. L. REV. 693, 727 (2000); see also ANTOINE ARNAULD & PIERRE NICOLE,
LOGIC OR THE ART OF THINKING 135–36 (Jill Vance Buroke ed. & trans., 1996)
(explaining the logical fallacy of inferring a connection between multiple items
based on incomplete suppositions); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF
JUSTICE 48, 75 (1981) (discussing the logic of law, its treatment of like things,
and its assessment of similar and different things).
269. See generally MAX BLACK, CRITICAL THINKING 14–15 (2d ed. 1952)
(discussing the necessity of accounting for relevant facts).
270. The Court, although relying on the Sixth Amendment right to a jury,
has struck down mandatory sentencing regimes on analogous grounds. In
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), the Court emphasized that certain
aspects of a crime are inherently relevant to violation of that crime and, thus,
the jury must decide them. It was therefore beyond the power of the legislature to take those inquiries away from the jury and assign them to the judge.
Id. at 306–07. In Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999), to avoid a similar
problem, the Court likewise inferred that harm to the victim was an element
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Third, treating dissimilar individuals the same produces
arbitrary results—a key marker of a substantive due process
271
violation —rather than calculated results. If the factors relied
upon are irrelevant, they may also be random. For instance, if a
school punished a well-behaved student simply because the
student shared the characteristic of wearing a blue shirt with a
misbehaving student, it could just as easily punish a student
for a red, yellow, or purple shirt. Treatment based on irrelevant
factors becomes as random and arbitrary as drawing names out
of a hat or being struck by lightning. Due process history, motivations, and precedent are explicit in their prohibition against
272
arbitrary results.
With that said, it is not uncommon for the government to
focus on factors that are one or more steps removed from the
most relevant factor(s). For instance, the government in the effort to protect our water supply might cast a wide net and pass
a rule prohibiting the pouring of any liquid into our water supply outdoors. This would capture both the polluter and the person washing his dog in the back yard or tossing out spoiled
milk. The intent of the broad net would be to ensure the ensnarement of the toxic polluter, but if the intent did not include
ensnaring the milk-tosser, the rule would be irrational in design because it was aimed too broadly at a benign activity simply because it corresponded in some way with independent problematic activity. By focusing on a factor that was related but
too far attenuated from the primary problematic activity of polluting, the rule would produce random and, hence, irrational
results. All punished under the rule would have poured something, but if the rule was enforced evenhandedly against all
pourers, the punished class would likely be no more significantly populated by “polluters” than any other class of individuals
273
one might randomly identify in society. As one court wrote of
students who drank from a punchbowl that had been secretly
of the crime even though the statute did not identify it as such. Id. at 232.
271. See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884) (indicating
the purpose of due process is to prevent “arbitrary exercise of the powers of
government”).
272. Fallon, supra note 255, at 310.
273. If the rule was evenhandedly enforced, the harmless pourer would
likely alter his behavior and no longer be subject to punishment, leaving the
polluter as the only penalized group. In this respect, the law would have
achieved its pollution goal, but in the process, it would have arbitrarily restricted the liberty and freedom of many innocent citizens. That a law might
further a desirable end does not make it rational if it also produces numerous
other random or arbitrary ends.
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spiked with alcohol, suspending those students “would not rationally advance the school’s legitimate interest in preventing
underage students from drinking alcohol on school premises
any more than suspending a handful of students chosen at ran274
dom from the school’s directory.” In short, government action
is random and arbitrary when it is based on factors insufficiently related to its goals, even if those factors correspond in
some respect to its goals. The more difficult question is determining the point at which a factor is sufficiently irrelevant or
relevant that consideration or neglect of the factor renders a
governmental decision random or arbitrary. At this point, however, it suffices to consider the foregoing principles’ operation in
the most important context: “the innocent.”
B. PUNISHING INNOCENT INDIVIDUALS IS IRRATIONAL
Process and rules that by design punish or allow for the
275
punishment of the innocent violate due process. Process, of
course, cannot be flawless and will inevitably punish the inno276
cent. That punishment would be considered an error, and this
Article does not suggest that errors are presumptive violations
of due process. Rather, the principle forwarded here is that a
state process or rule that claims to have reached the correct result for an individual, even though the state knew or should
have known an individual was innocent, violates substantive
due process. First, the state lacks a legitimate goal for inten277
Second, while the state
tionally punishing the innocent.
might claim that its legitimate goal is punishing the guilty and
the punishment of some innocent individuals is incidental and

274. Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 578 (6th Cir. 2000).
275. See, e.g., People v. Washington, 665 N.E.2d 1330, 1336–37 (Ill. 1996);
State ex rel. Holmes v. Court of Appeals, 885 S.W.2d 389, 397–98 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1994). See generally Ursula Bentele, Does the Death Penalty, by Risking
Execution of the Innocent, Violate Substantive Due Process?, 40 HOUS. L. REV.
1359 (2004) (analyzing innocence in the context of substantive due process). In
Herrera v. Collins, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Souter and Stevens,
stated definitively: “Nothing could be more contrary to contemporary standards of decency or more shocking to the conscience than to execute a person
who is actually innocent.” 506 U.S. 390, 430 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted). The three dissenting justices agreed with Justice
O’Connor’s concurring opinion on this point. See id. at 419 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
276. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976).
277. See, e.g., Seal, 229 F.3d at 578; see also Susan Bandes, Simple Murder:
A Comment on the Legality of Executing the Innocent, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 501,
503 (1996).
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necessary to that goal, that incidental punishment is only justifiable and rational if it is accidental, not intentional or in reck278
less disregard for innocence.
By “innocent,” this Article means individuals who (1) have
not breached the letter of the law; or (2) have not engaged in
normatively (whether morally, socially, or practically) objec279
tionable behavior. Extensive scholarship, of course, has been
280
devoted to what norms are just. This Article makes no pretense of evaluating those competing norms and, instead, proceeds based on the approach that our laws and Constitution
have, as a practical matter, taken. Our laws primarily rest upon a normative approach that defines innocence and guilt in
281
terms of mental culpability. A person’s actions alone are almost never sufficient to justify punishment, as the person has
not engaged in what society deems repugnant behavior. For instance, it is not a crime to kill someone. It is a crime to kill
someone when it is done with certain types of intent.
The only instances in which our laws diverge from this approach are where the punishment is minimal or the behavior is

278. See Bentele, supra note 275, at 1368.
279. To avoid a huge divergence into innocence, this Article’s explanation of
what it means to be innocent or “otherwise innocent” grossly oversimplifies the
issue. To be slightly clearer, the Court, while espousing a commitment to innocence, has upheld strict liability in some instances. Alan Michaels offers a
thorough analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence and a more refined articulation
of the constitutional limits of punishing the innocent:
According to the principle of constitutional innocence, strict liability is constitutional when, but only when, the intentional conduct covered by the statute could be made criminal by the legislature. In other
words, strict liability runs afoul of the Constitution if the other elements of the crime, with the strict liability element excluded, could
not themselves be made a crime. Otherwise, strict liability is constitutional.
Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional Innocence, 112 HARV. L. REV. 828, 834
(1999).
280. See, e.g., Gary V. Dubin, Mens Rea Reconsidered: A Plea for a Due
Process Concept of Criminal Responsibility, 18 STAN. L. REV. 322 (1966); C.
Peter Erlinder, Mens Rea, Due Process, and the Supreme Court: Toward a
Constitutional Doctrine of Substantive Criminal Law, 9 AM. J. CRIM. L. 163
(1981); Keith A. Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1157 (2011);
John Calvin Jeffries, Jr. & Paul B. Stephan III, Defenses, Presumptions, and
Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325 (1979); Laurie L.
Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes, 78
CORNELL L. REV. 401 (1993); Michaels, supra note 279.
281. See generally Kennedy, supra note 34, at 761 (explaining the Court’s
treatment of mens rea and balancing blameworthiness of mental state with
severity of punishment).
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282

inherently problematic or speaks for itself. Where the punishment is minimal, an assessment of culpability may not be
283
worth the individual’s or society’s time. In other instances,
the behavior necessarily carries the requisite mental culpabil284
ity and, thus, does not warrant special inquiry. Both points
are bound up in prohibitions on operating cars in excess of the
speed limit. Operating a car in excess of the speed limit poses
the same risks and threats to the public, regardless of whether
it is accidental or intentional. Thus, low level regulatory crimes
of this sort do not include culpability requirements. With that
said, punishing the normatively innocent remains a concern
and, even in the context of speeding, our laws and courts would
narrowly construe “operating,” so as to exclude the “innocent”
from punishment. A person driving a run-away speeding Prius
is not necessarily “operating” a car. Thus, even a law that lacks
an explicit culpability component tends to be construed as including one.
C. ZERO TOLERANCE DISREGARDS SIGNIFICANT DISTINCTIONS
AND INNOCENCE
Zero tolerance policies vary by state and locality. Many
surely include nuances that allow them to be applied constitutionally. But many, either in form or function, treat dissimilarly situated students as though they are the same. Aggressive
zero tolerance policies lump various categorically different
285
types of behavior together. These categories of behavior range
from trivial to serious misbehavior, and illegal behavior to behavior that is neither illegal nor normatively problematic. For
instance, alcohol, tobacco, and drug offenses, which include
possession, consumption, intoxication, and sales, are typically
286
lumped together. All of these items and activities are rightly
off limits for students on school grounds and this Article does
not question that they can be punished. But these items and
282. Id. at 835–36.
283. Cf. id. at 781–82, 835–36 (discussing how, in some cases, danger to
society allows for a low mens rea requirement).
284. See id. at 841, 853–54 (discussing how sentencing should take into account those that are morally innocent and further discussing a theory that
those that act immorally should still be punished, even if they believed their
behavior was legal).
285. Kim Fries & Todd A. DeMitchell, Zero Tolerance and the Paradox of
Fairness: Viewpoint from a Classroom, 36 J.L. & EDUC. 211, 213, 222 (2007).
286. See ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 60, at 15; Fries & DeMitchell,
supra note 285, at 213.
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activities are not the same. The student who regularly sells
drugs to his classmates in the school parking lot is far different
from the student who consumes marijuana, given to him by his
wayward uncle, in the basement of his own home. Both students may have engaged in a crime, but in some locations the
latter may have committed no more than a minor misdemeanor
287
that carries a fine, whereas the former may have committed a
288
serious felony. Equally, if not more important, the latter
would not have involved or endangered anyone but himself, nor
would he have entered school property, whereas the former
would have transgressed all three factors. Zero tolerance policies, however, often disregard distinctions between on-campus
289
and off-campus behavior, as well as distinctions between se290
rious and relatively minor misbehavior.
One might allow that, while distinct, all illegal activities
are sufficiently serious that they warrant the same response
from schools and, thus, schools need not parse them out. Even
if that rationale could be substantiated—which it probably
cannot—it does not justify the breadth of some zero tolerance
policies. Alcohol and tobacco are legal items and, under certain
circumstances, a student might have legal access to them out291
side of school. Minors’ access to items such as ibuprofen, aspirin, cough drops, and other over-the-counter “drugs” is relatively broad. In contrast, items such as cocaine and marijuana are
controlled substances that neither adults nor minors can legally obtain (outside of Colorado and Washington and those states
292
that permit its medicinal use). None of this is to suggest that
schools should permit students to bring any of these items to
school, but attending school with alcohol or nicotine in one’s
system or ibuprofen in one’s pocket is far different than having
287. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 48-904.01 (2014); see also Aaron C. Davis, D.C.
Poised for a Giant Leap Toward Legalizing Small Amounts of Marijuana,
WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc
-politics/dc-poised-for-giant-leap-toward-legalizing-marijuana/2013/10/24/
db183fb0-3cbe-11e3-b6a9-da62c264f40e_story.html.
288. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3411 (2009); see also D.C. CODE
§ 48-904.07a (2014).
289. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-3401 (2014) (giving principals the
power to suspend students for being charged with a felony off school grounds).
290. AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N ZERO TOLERANCE TASK FORCE, ARE ZERO
TOLERANCE POLICIES EFFECTIVE IN THE SCHOOLS? AN EVIDENTIARY REVIEW
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 31 (2006), http://www.apa.org/pubs/info/reports/zero
-tolerance-report.pdf.
291. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4301.69 (LexisNexis 2006).
292. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012).
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a controlled substance in one’s system. The latter would by necessity have engaged in illegal activity, whereas the former
would not have.
Consider the student whose parents allowed him a glass
(or two) of wine to celebrate some significant event the night
before school or cough drops and ibuprofen to control a cold at
school versus the student who purchased and smoked marijuana in the school parking lot before entering school. By their
text, most zero tolerance policies would treat the aforementioned wine drinking or ibuprofen and cough drop carrying stu293
dent the same as the pot smoker. Some would treat the wine
drinking student the same, even if he did not enter school with
alcohol in his system. At least one school that made national
news did not even premise its zero tolerance policy toward alcohol on consumption. It was enough that a student was involved in an alcohol incident, by which the school simply meant
294
being in the presence of alcohol consumption. Egregious examples such as these, even if rare, reveal the irrationality of
zero tolerance policies that refuse to distinguish between the
legal and illegal, the serious and trivial, on- and off-campus behavior, and the innocent and culpable.
The lack of distinction between the legal and illegal, or
dangerous and non-dangerous activity, is even more problematic in zero tolerance’s approach to weapons. Policies often define
a weapons offense in the broadest sense possible—“possess[ing]
any item capable of inflicting injury or harm (hereinafter re295
ferred to as a weapon) to persons or property” —and punish
296
all offenses with long-term suspension or expulsion. The obvious intent of a broad definition of “weapon” (or “drug”) is to
err on the side of safety and sweep in as much conduct as possible. Legitimate safety motivations, however, do not sanction
irrational policies and implementation. Broad definitions treat
293. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 18, at 71–72 (discussing the broad
interpretation of drugs, alcohol, and weapons in school policies); see also Fries
& DeMitchell, supra note 285, at 107 (discussing the broad interpretation of
weapons).
294. Black, supra note 4; Murphy, supra note 1; see also supra notes 1–4
and accompanying text. To be fair, the punishment under this particular policy related to participation in sports, not expulsion from school, Murphy, supra
note 1, but the same irrationality is present nonetheless.
295. See, e.g., GREENVILLE CNTY. SCH., POLICIES § JCDAA (2008), available
at http://www.boarddocs.com/sc/greenville/Board.nsf/Public (enter “Policies”
tab; then expand “J-Students” section; then select “JCDAA: Weapons in
School”).
296. See, e.g., id.
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benign or “innocent” behavior as equivalent to malevolent violence. Some school districts have deemed key-chains, staplers,
geometry compasses, and finger nail clippers as weapons, and
297
expelled students for merely possessing them. No doubt, circumstances could arise in which these items are equivalent to
weapons, but those circumstances would involve a student using or intending to use the item as a weapon, not simply possessing the item. Zero tolerance policies frequently ignore this
crucially relevant circumstance and instead focus on the fact
that these items share some quality—sharpness or capacity to
harm—with definitive weapons. But sharing a quality with a
definitive weapon no more makes a fingernail clipper a weapon
than does sharing the characteristic of insanity with the Un298
abomber make one a terrorist.
None of this is to say that a school might not permissibly
and explicitly prohibit bringing fingernail clippers to school,
but it does not follow that a school can still treat and punish
them as though they are weapons. Because fingernail clippers
are benign, legal, and particularly useful items, there are any
number of ways that a student may accidentally bring such an
item to school. Even though the school might confiscate or impose some minor punishment, no rationale exists by which to
punish the accidental possession of a benign, legal, and particularly useful item as one would punish the intentional possession of a hunting knife or firearm, by expulsion. To do so is to
irrationally (1) merge non-weapons with weapons, and (2) presume a high level of culpability or intent based on possession
where none likely exists.
This merger and presumption also necessarily make the
“innocent” subject to mandatory expulsion. The only way by
which to characterize the student who accidentally brings fingernail clippers or cough drops to school as something other
than innocent is to imagine a strict liability totalitarian world

297. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 18, at 72.
298. It was this exact type of flawed reasoning that lead the Court to strike
down the detention of an alleged enemy combatant in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507 (2004), as a violation of due process. While Hamdi shared the characteristic of having been seized in Afghanistan—if not the battlefield—with a
larger class of individuals who posed a threat to the United States or its soldiers, this fact alone could not render Hamdi an enemy combatant or foreclose
the need to inquire further into his situation. Id. at 527 (plurality opinion). To
focus solely on that characteristic would fail to account for individuals who are
clearly not enemy combatants: “errant tourist[s], embedded journalist[s], or
local aid worker[s].” Id. at 534.
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in which conduct is permissible or impermissible, not based on
policy or reason, but based on the fact that the government has
“said so.” But in our democratic and constitutional regime, and
even if the context of schools that have far more responsibility
and latitude for shaping student character, our courts have repeatedly rejected the notion that government or schools can op299
erate as totalitarian regimes.
Some would, nonetheless, defend policies that punish the
300
innocent as rationally related to the goal of safety. They reason that strict and inflexible rules, even if they punish the innocent, further safety by leaving no potential threat unpun301
ished. This reasoning, however, is seriously flawed because
the “innocent” student who unknowingly possesses a nail clipper, or even a pocket knife, is not a “potential threat” any more
than a student who does not possess a “weapon.” Thus, expelling such a student does not, in any way, serve a school’s safety
goals. As the Sixth Circuit explained:
[S]uspending or expelling a student for weapons possession, even if
the student did not knowingly possess any weapon, would not be rationally related to any legitimate state interest. No student can use a
weapon to injure another person, to disrupt school operations, or, for
that matter, any other purpose if the student is totally unaware of its
302
presence.

The Supreme Court has further emphasized in other contexts that unchecked and undifferentiated punishment of individuals “carries the potential to become a means for oppression
and abuse of others who do not present th[e] sort of threat” the
303
government is seeking to eliminate.
What the school is really asserting when it punishes the
“innocent” is not an interest in safety, but in convenience or efficiency. Without question, it is more convenient to punish
299. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975); Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1968); see also Hamdi, 542
U.S. at 530, 535 (plurality opinion) (warning that government action unchecked by fair and full due process can “become a means of oppression,” and
rejecting the government’s assertion that judicial review of individual cases
would interfere with its overall execution of national policy).
300. Deborah Gordon Klehr, Addressing the Unintended Consequences of
No Child Left Behind and Zero Tolerance: Better Strategies for Safe Schools
and Successful Students, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 585, 588–90
(2009) (discussing the rationale of safe schools and zero tolerance).
301. This rationale draws on the broken windows theory of policing. See
generally James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29.
302. Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 575 (6th Cir. 2000).
303. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 530 (plurality opinion).
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based on predicate facts that correspond with threats—
possessing a sharp object for instance—than based on actual
threats themselves. But efficiency alone is not a legitimate basis to punish the innocent, particularly when the innocent are
readily distinguishable. The very purpose of due process is to
separate the “guilty” from the “innocent,” and draw reasonable
304
distinctions between those to be regulated. A rule that lumps
the guilty and innocent into a single category simply to ease the
305
burden of due process serves no legitimate goal.
Efficiency serves as a legitimate interest in determining
how much process a government actor should afford, but not in
limiting the key inquiries process must pursue. For instance,
courts have held that allowing a student to be represented by
an attorney and cross-examine witnesses imposes too much of a
burden on a school, particularly in regard to a short-term sus306
pension. But even if attorneys and cross-examination are too
burdensome, no court has ever suggested that a school, so long
as it held some type of informal hearing, could do away with
the underlying question of, for instance, which of five students
destroyed their teacher’s book bag simply because sorting the
307
guilty from the innocent would be burdensome. Zero tolerance
policies that disregard circumstances do exactly that. They dis304. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80–81 (1972); see also 1
KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.01 (1958) (discussing due process requirements in the context of administrative law).
305. This idea is also indirectly at play in the Court’s Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence on mandatory criminal punishment guidelines. In several cases,
Congress or a state has taken certain relevant fact finding inquiries away
from the jury, asking the jury to only find certain basic predicate facts, and
making punishment mandatory upon a jury finding those facts. The Court has
found these systems unconstitutional. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220, 230 (2005) (rejecting approaches that would “reduc[e] the jury’s role
‘to the relative importance of low-level gatekeeping’” (citing Jones v. United
States, 526 U.S. 227, 244 (1999))); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306–
07 (2004) (“The jury could not function as circuitbreaker in the State's machinery of justice if it were relegated to making a determination that the defendant at some point did something wrong, a mere preliminary to a judicial
inquisition into the facts of the crime the State actually seeks to punish.” (emphasis omitted)).
306. See e.g., Osteen v. Henley, 13 F.3d 221, 225 (7th Cir. 1993); Newsome
v. Batavia Local Sch. Dist., 842 F.2d 920, 925–26 (6th Cir. 1988); Gorman v.
Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 16 (1st Cir. 1988).
307. Recognizing the state’s legitimate interest in preserving its finite resources, the Court has acceded to balancing the risk of error against the burden of more process, but the Court has not suggested that avoiding the question of guilt and innocence is a legitimate means of achieving that end. See
generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976).
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regard innocence and the fundamental question that the Court
in Goss indicated schools must answer: whether punishment is
308
“warranted.”
Finally, putting aside the problems of broadly defining
weapons and drugs, conflating possession with use, and ignoring innocence, many states and schools also extend zero tolerance or expulsion to behavior that cannot under any circumstances be construed as being as serious or egregious as drugs
or weapons. For instance, it is not uncommon for disciplinary
codes to treat tardiness, disrespect, and defiance as a basis for
309
suspension and expulsion. Granted, policies do not tend to
expel students for one instance of tardiness or disrespect, but
repeat instances—two or three—have led to mandatory sus310
pension and expulsion in many districts and states. While
these behaviors warrant a response, disrespect, even if repeated, is in no way equivalent to selling drugs at school. Yet, some
schools treat them as such.
South Carolina’s disciplinary statute, while not mandating
expulsion for these minor behaviors, captures the irrationality.
The relevant statute provides that a district may expel, suspend, or transfer “any pupil for the commission of any crime,
gross immorality, gross misbehavior, persistent disobedience,
or for violation of written rules and promulgated regulations
established by the district board, county board, or the State
311
Board of Education.” On its face, it equates a crime with persistent disobedience, authorizing the same maximum penalty
for both. It then provides, however, that a district “shall not authorize or order the expulsion, suspension, or transfer of any
312
pupil for a violation of Section 59-150-250(B),” which makes it
a misdemeanor for a minor to knowingly purchase a lottery
313
game ticket. In other words, a district may expel a student for
disobeying a teacher’s instruction on a regular basis, but it may
not even suspend a student who commits the misdemeanor of
buying a lottery ticket in the middle of math class. Thus, the
statute implicitly recognizes the irrational conflation of substantially dissimilar behavior in one instance—selling cocaine
versus buying a lottery ticket—but rejects the more obvious
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975).
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-33-106 (2014).
See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-11-18.1 (2014).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-210(A) (2013).
Id. § 59-63-210(B).
Id. § 59-150-250(B).
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and pertinent distinctions between the classroom clown and the
parking lot criminal. In this respect, the grounds for suspension
and expulsion are both over- and under-inclusive, a paradig314
matic indicator of irrationality.
D. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND RATIONAL DECISIONMAKING REQUIRE THE CONSIDERATION OF THREE
INDIVIDUALIZED FACTORS: INTENT, CULPABILITY, AND HARM
The foregoing Sections advanced the general proposition
that due process requires the consideration of relevant circumstances, without delineating the precise boundaries of relevance and whether any circumstances are per se relevant. Numerous factors and circumstances are potentially relevant in
determining whether and how to punish a student, and they
vary according to the behavior and punishment. A school district might have discretion as to whether to consider some factors and circumstances, such as whether a behavior occurred
before or during class or whether a student was experiencing
trouble in his home life. Factors and circumstances of this sort,
while relevant, might be limited or trumped by other factors
and circumstances, such as whether the student was to be punished by expulsion or detention. Substantive due process, however, would mandate the consideration of another category of
circumstances and factors, at least, when the punishment to be
imposed is suspension or expulsion. In particular, a district
must consider or account for intent, culpability, capacity, and
harm (i.e., danger or disruption to school). As the following
subsections will demonstrate, punishment in the absence of
these considerations is constitutionally irrational.
1. Intent
The foremost factor in assessing student behavior is intent.
The irrationality of disregarding intent is sufficiently egregious
that this is the one area where, in contrast to the overwhelming
trend of summary affirmance of discipline, a few courts have
been willing to intercede. The leading case on point is Seal v.
314. The Court, however, has upheld laws that are both under- and overinclusive, reasoning that perfection in the rational relationship “is by no
means required.” N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 592 n.39
(1979) (quoting Phillips Chem. Co. v. Dumas Sch. Dist., 361 U.S. 376, 385
(1960)). But at some point laws are so over- and under-inclusive that they are
irrational. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 687–89 (4th ed. 2011) (discussing the levels of scrutiny and
the rational basis test).
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315

Morgan. The case involved the expulsion of a student for driv316
ing a car to school that contained a knife. The knife was not
317
his, and he was unaware that it was in the car. The board,
nonetheless, insisted on his expulsion, and the Sixth Circuit of318
fered a full rejoinder. First, expelling a student for unknowingly possessing a weapon is “not . . . rationally related to any
legitimate state interest” because such a student poses no
319
threat to anyone. Second, “possession” crimes, even when
they do not explicitly state intent as an element, “ordinarily
320
impl[y] knowing or conscious possession.” Even were that implication missing, courts have indicated that due process prohibits state legislatures from removing intent as an element in
321
crimes. Third, intent is not some criminal “technicality” but a
fundamental precept of substantive due process “so obvious
322
that it would go without saying.” Thus, intent applies to punishment and deprivations other than criminal, including expulsion and suspension. For instance, the court opined that a
school could not, consistent with due process, expel a valedicto-

315. 229 F.3d 567 (6th Cir. 2000).
316. Id. at 571–72.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 581.
319. Id. at 575.
320. Id. at 575–76.
321. Id. (“See Wayne R. LaFave & Austin [W.] Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 3.2, at 279 (1986 & Supp. 2000) (noting that ‘[f]or legal purposes
other than criminal law—e.g., the law of finders—one may possess something
without knowing of its existence, but possession in a criminal statute is usually construed to mean conscious possession’) (footnotes omitted); see also United
States v. Lewis, 701 F.2d 972, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J.) (observing that in
order [‘]to withstand a motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of constructive possession of an illegal firearm,[’] the government must introduce
sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude ‘that the possession was
“knowing” ’) (citation omitted); United States v. Sawyer, 294 F.2d 24, 29 (4th
Cir. 1961) (noting, in a prosecution for unlawful possession of inventory for
liquor bootlegging, that ‘possession, when charged as a crime, must be conscious’); State v. Rice, 172 Conn. 94, 374 A.2d 128, 132 (1976) (concluding, in a
prosecution for unlawful carrying of a firearm in a motor vehicle, that constitutional due process requires the government to prove the defendant’s knowing possession of the firearm); State v. Labato, 7 N.J. 137, 80 A.2d 617, 62[3]
(1951) (noting in a criminal prosecution for possession of illegal lottery tickets,
that the state legislature could legitimately abrogate the common law requirement of scienter, or evil intent, and impose criminal liability on persons
who did not know that their possession of the tickets was illegal, but could not
abrogate the requirement that the persons intentionally possessed the tickets).” (alteration in original)).
322. Seal, 229 F.3d at 576.
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rian who unknowingly had a knife planted in his backpack
323
based simply on his possession of the knife.
While none have joined Seal in recognizing these points so
forcefully, the court’s rationale is largely unchallenged by other
courts. Without suggesting generally applicable substantive
due process holdings, a group of courts have sided with Seal
and reversed student suspensions and expulsions where intent
324
is lacking. Those courts that do not follow Seal have stretched
to distinguish it, either unquestionably deferring to a school’s
conclusion that intent existed or independently inferring intent
325
themselves based on the facts. These courts may outnumber
the Seal-leaning courts, but their holdings generally rest on
deference to schools and exempting school codes from the strict
constitutional rigor applied to the criminal code. These cases do
not offer a substantive due process defense or justification for
326
expelling a student who lacked intent, nor could they. The
concept of intent is so rooted in history, logic, and substantive
due process that departure from it requires a highly unique or
persuasive justification, which is lacking in zero tolerance and
harsh discipline.
While not controlling in education, the criminal context,
327
nonetheless, is instructive on the question of intent. The Supreme Court and lower courts have offered a framework for
323. Id.
324. See Langley ex rel. Langley v. Monroe Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 1:05CV40,
2006 WL 2850349, at *4 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 2, 2006); Tarkington Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Ellis, 200 S.W.3d 794, 803–04 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006); see also Christopher D. Pelliccioni, Note, Is Intent Required? Zero Tolerance, Scienter, and the
Substantive Due Process Rights of Students, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 977, 996
(2003) (arguing that the disregard for intent in zero tolerance is unconstitutional).
325. See, e.g., S.G. ex rel. A.G. v. Sayreville Bd. of Educ., 333 F.3d 417, 425
(3rd Cir. 2003); Butler v. Rio Rancho Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 341 F.3d 1197,
1201 (10th Cir. 2003); Piekosz-Murphy v. Bd. of Educ., 858 F. Supp. 2d 952,
961 (N.D. Ill. 2012); Posthumus v. Bd. of Educ., 380 F. Supp. 2d 891, 899
(W.D. Mich. 2005); Bundick v. Bay City Indep. Sch. Dist., 140 F. Supp. 2d 735,
740 (S.D. Tex. 2001). The only arguable departure from the requirement of intent was in Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 625 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1980), where
the court was forceful in upholding a blanket policy regarding weapons on
school grounds as being rationally related to safety, but even there, the facts
indicated the students possessed intent. Id. at 661.
326. See supra notes 281–84 and accompanying text.
327. While the Court in Wood v. Strickland did not reach the question of
whether the lower court had properly applied the due process rationale from a
criminal case, the Court implied that this approach was misplaced. 420 U.S.
308, 323–24 (1975). Regardless, this implication was context specific and does
not preclude the application of general substantive due process review.
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considering the relevance and role of intent, not as technicality,
but as a substantive aspect of due process in general. There,
courts have recognized only one major exception to the requirement of intent: regulatory measures aimed at public wel328
fare or danger. Included in these measures are “crimes” like
329
parking and fire code violations. Courts have been willing to
find an exception to intent with these crimes for two primary
reasons. First, they are not traditional crimes like assault,
theft, and murder. They are new crimes outside of our due process traditions and our general concept of a crime. As the Supreme Court in Morissette v. United States explained, these
crimes, in contrast to traditional crimes, involve “neglect where
330
the law requires care, or inaction where it imposes a duty.”
Thus, unlike traditional crimes, a violation does not turn on the
intent of the offender, and rightfully so, as these new crimes
pose a danger to society as a whole. In these respects, these
crimes are public welfare regulations in a class unto themselves. Second, the “penalties [for public welfare crimes] commonly are relatively small, and conviction does no grave dam331
age to an offender’s reputation.” As one court remarked,
public welfare breaches are only crimes in name or form, not
332
function. In other words, the stakes are low enough for the
individual and high enough for the public as a whole that dispensing with intent, or at least specific intent, is permissible.
With that said, the substantive importance of intent to fairness
still leaves courts uneasy to invariably commit to the foregoing
exception. As Joseph Kennedy has explained, courts have left
open the possibility of limiting the enforcement of intentless
regulatory crimes where doing so is necessary to avoid unjust
333
results.
There are other limited instances, outside of regulatory
measures, in which courts have approved criminal sanctions in
the absence of intent, but these instances tend to be sui generis
rather than categorical. For instance, courts have upheld statutory rape laws and automatic weapon possession prohibitions
that would incarcerate individuals even though they lacked in328. See generally Kennedy, supra note 34, at 768 (explaining that such
crimes “specifie[d] no intent as a necessary element”).
329. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 262 n.20 (1952).
330. Id. at 255.
331. Id. at 256.
332. Tenement House Dep’t v. McDevitt, 215 N.Y. 160, 168 (1915).
333. Kennedy, supra note 34, at 836.
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334

tent to commit a crime. No clear theory binds these minor exceptions together other than that they touch upon activities
that society had deemed far afield of acceptable behavior and,
thus, the law places an affirmative obligation on citizens to
avoid that behavior. Beyond that, the similarities begin to
break down. With automatic weapons, the rationale would ap335
pear to be the serious and intrinsic nature they pose. With
statutory rape, punishment is premised on the need to protect a
particularly vulnerable group from serious risks of exploita336
tion.
School suspensions and expulsions do not fall within these
exceptions, nor are they analogous. School discipline is distinct
from public welfare regulation in the activity regulated and the
punishment to be imposed. Unlike those driving a car, constructing and maintaining buildings, or providing food to the
public, students attending school are under no general or af337
firmative obligation to protect others from harm. They owe no
duty to inspect their backpacks throughout the day or test the
chemical content of the liquid in their water bottle before sharing it with a friend or drinking from it themselves. Nor would
such an obligation make sense because, in the absence of intentional misdeeds, there is nothing in their bags or possession
that poses any threat of danger or interference with the operation of school. If analogous to anything, the student conduct to
be regulated is similar to traditional crimes of violence and
theft or modern drug crimes, all of which, then and now, require intent as a matter of due process.
Most important, the punishment imposed on students is
not minor. Zero tolerance and harsh discipline deprive students
not just of the property right considered in Goss, but of a con338
stitutional right recognized by numerous state courts. Moreover, both the deprivation and the effects are often long-term.
334. Pelliccioni, supra note 324, at 997–1001.
335. Id. at 1000.
336. Id. at 997–98.
337. Cf. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 414 (2000) (articulating the
no duty rule for defamation).
338. See King ex rel. Harvey-Barrow v. Beaufort Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 704
S.E.2d 259, 260–61 (N.C. 2010); Phillip Leon M. ex rel. J.P.M. v. Greenbrier
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 484 S.E.2d 909, 911 (W. Va. 1996). See generally Michael
A. Rebell, Poverty, “Meaningful” Educational Opportunity, and the Necessary
Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1500–05 (2007) (discussing the requirements of a constitutionally-guaranteed adequate public school education).

BLACK_5fmt

886

1/25/2015 1:21 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[99:823

Zero tolerance policies exclude students from school for extended periods of time and, in practice, function as the equivalent of
339
an educational death penalty for many students. To reiterate
the Fifth Circuit, expulsion is “the extreme” and “ultimate punishment,” stretching to the outer bounds of the educational sys340
tems’ “power to act” and harm students. For these reasons,
courts during the immediate pre- and post-Goss years were
particularly concerned with schools’ substantive justifications
341
for expelling students. The holdings in those cases are entirely inconsistent with any notion that expulsion is a minor punishment or the nature of student behavior justifies a public welfare approach. Some argue that activities like weapons and
drugs pose such a serious threat to schools that rigid lines must
342
be drawn in the sand. Judge Suhrheinrich in dissent in Seal
wrote: “[S]chools act in loco parentis. Given this enormous responsibility, and the potentially devastating consequences of
weapons on campus, a strict weapons policy is rationally related to a legitimate government interest—protecting our children
343
from the very real threat of violence.” This rationale draws on
both the public welfare exception and those sui generis exceptions that pertain to extreme dangers or circumstances, but zero tolerance fits in neither.
Judge Suhrheinrich, like others, is conflating the schools’
duty with students’ duty. One might marshal a public welfare
argument for holding a school liable for students’ safety, regardless of the school’s intent, but the same is not true of holding students accountable. As noted above, students do not owe
any affirmative duty to their peers. The fact that the government may owe such a duty does not provide a basis for imposing discipline on students who may lack intent and would otherwise be protected by due process. Moreover, even if students
339. I would concede that schools might be given more leeway with less serious punishments like limited in-school suspension or writing “penalties,”
although, even here, one struggles with the justification for punishing the innocent if the activity regulated is distinct from traditional public welfare
crimes.
340. Lee v. Macon Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 490 F.2d 458, 460 (5th Cir. 1974).
341. See, e.g., C.L.S. v. Hoover Bd. of Educ., 594 So. 2d 138, 139 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1991). See generally ARUM, supra note 85, at 120 (explaining that earlier
courts indicated that age, past behavior, school performance, and actual disruption of current behavior are important considerations in expulsion decisions).
342. See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 18, at 79–80.
343. Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 582 (6th Cir. 2000) (Suhrheinrich, J.,
dissenting).

BLACK_5fmt

2015]

1/25/2015 1:21 PM

ZERO TOLERANCE

887

had an affirmative duty, the public welfare exemption is prem344
ised on low level punishment of an “unintentional violator,”
not the ultimate punishments schools are imposing.
Schools can make a stronger argument that the risk of
weapons and drugs to students is equivalent to the risk that
automatic weapons, for instance, pose to society. The comparison, however, rests more on sensationalism and emotional appeals than reality. For instance, Judge Suhrheinrich points to a
high profile shooting to justify the disregard for intent, writing,
“The Columbine High School massacre and other school shootings have, unfortunately, become part of the national con345
sciousness.”
Events such as these, however, are isolated.
346
Schools remain one of the safest places a student can be. This
is not to say that events like Columbine should be ignored.
Schools are certainly rational in implementing preventative
measures. But it does not follow that a district should disregard
intent. School shootings arise not from accidental or even neglectful actions on the part of a student, but from calculated intentional actions.
Even if one allowed that Columbine justified intentless zero tolerance toward firearms, Columbine would not justify the
same toward, for instance, fingernail clippers and butter
knives. The exceptions to intent are narrow. In the criminal
context, for instance, strict liability applies only to a subclass of
distinctively and unusually dangerous weapons, not to weapons
347
in general. Thus, at best, schools might disregard intent for
firearms, but no justification could be marshalled in regard to
other items that are generally benign simply because they
could theoretically be used as weapons. The same problem
would arise with regard to schools’ broad definitions of drugs.
In sum, while a court owes general deference to schools in
the administration of discipline, a court need not afford any on
the question of intent. As the rationale of Seal and our legal
history demonstrates, substantive due process presumes the
requirement of intent. Courts have recognized only a narrow
class of specified exceptions. Thus, the burden falls on the educational system to justify any exemption to intent it might
seek. Placing that burden on schools, moreover, is not contrary
to the deference generally owed to schools in the administration
344.
345.
346.
347.

See supra notes 328–33 and accompanying text.
Seal, 229 F.3d at 582 (Suhrheinrich, J., dissenting).
Majd, supra note 60, at 360–61.
Pelliccioni, supra note 324, at 1000–01.
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348

of discipline. General deference is not intended as a license
for schools to enact any rules they see fit, so long as they can
articulate a rationale that they subjectively believe to be correct. To sanction all such rules would, in the words of the court
in Seal, allow a school to “insulate itself even from rational ba349
sis review.” When schools adopt or apply rules that are facially inconsistent with substantive due process principles, the
burden rightly falls on them to justify the rules. Presently, no
justifications other than sensationalized danger—and the notion that hard lines are necessary to protect against it—can be
offered in defense of zero tolerance policies that disregard intent. Both of those justifications fail.
2. Culpability
The second factor a school must consider in imposing student discipline is culpability. While there may be certain circumstances in which culpability is not germane, those circumstances, as with the requirement of intent, are exceptions to the
general rule. The concept of culpability is found throughout our
criminal codes, civil liability, and other forms of punishment.
For instance, an intentional, calculated murder is fundamental350
ly distinct from a bar-room brawl that ends in death. Killing
351
someone in self-defense is fundamentally different from both.
All might involve the intentional act of killing another person,
but each has a different level of culpability. Thus, the stateauthorized punishment, to the extent there is punishment, is
352
different for each, in both civil and criminal contexts.
The law also recognizes that while individuals might act
with the same type of intent, they may have different capacities, which alters the individual’s culpability. For instance, the
law tends to punish, criminally and civilly, children and adults
with diminished mental capacity differently than adults with
full capacity, although the exception for adults with diminished
353
capacity is far more limited. Regardless, the premise of the
348. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975) (indicating that
courts are not to second-guess schools).
349. Seal, 229 F.3d at 579.
350. See generally Kyron Huigens, The Continuity of Justification Defenses,
2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 627 (2009).
351. Id. at 645.
352. Id. at 681.
353. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 337, at 293 (finding that negligence law
holds children to a standard of care based on their age, intelligence, and experience).
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distinctions based on capacity is that legal consequences are
justified not simply on an individual’s actions or intent alone,
but on the individual’s responsibility for those actions. Responsibility tends to diminish when an individual’s mental capacity
354
is diminished, the individual lacks realistic options to act dif355
ferently, or the individual is compelled or persuaded to act for
356
otherwise legitimate reasons. The law accounts for these factors not because individuals with diminished capacity are innocent in any absolute sense (as is the case when intent is entirely lacking), but because they are the functional equivalent of
innocent or, at least, dissimilarly situated from the prototypical
357
offender. In this respect, punishing individuals with diminished mental capacity does little, if anything, to serve the law’s
358
objectives, particularly in criminal law. When punishment
serves no purpose, punishment is constitutionally irrational, or
rather violates substantive due process.
a. Minors’ Diminished Capacity
Most pertinent to this Article, children as a class have diminished mental capacity, and thus the law treats them differ359
ently than adults. On the criminal side, the law places juveniles in an entirely different category from adults and limits
360
the punishment they can receive. On the civil side, the law

354. See, e.g., Alan Brownstein, The Constitutionalization of Self-Defense in
Tort and Criminal Law, Grammatically-Correct Originalism, and Other Second Amendment Musings, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1205, 1235–36 (2009) (discussing
the consideration of a defendant’s subjective belief of imminent harm with regard to determining whether the defendant acted in self-defense); see also infra notes 359–362 and accompanying text.
355. “The rationale of the [duress] defense is . . . the defendant . . . avoided
a harm of greater magnitude.” WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR.,
CRIMINAL LAW 433 (2d ed. 1986). However, Lafave and Scott do not describe
necessity as negating the mens rea, but as a public policy to not punish where
the higher good is served by violations of the law. Id.
356. See Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188, 189 (Vt. 1908) (finding that necessity
justifies entries upon land which otherwise would be trespasses).
357. See generally James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded
Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414 (1985) (discussing the justifications and defenses for criminally punishing the mentally ill and mentally
retarded); Herbert Fingarette, Disabilities of Mind and Criminal Responsibility—A Unitary Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 236 (1976) (same).
358. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 355, at 305.
359. See Brown, supra note 133, at 938 (reviewing studies of students’ decision-making processes, maturity, and intellectual development across ages).
360. See generally Sarah M. Cotton, Comment, When the Punishment Cannot Fit the Crime: The Case for Reforming the Juvenile Justice System, 52 ARK.
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limits the types of legal obligations that can be placed on a mi361
nor, and considers age in assessing the liabilities it might im362
pose. The most instructive analysis of minors’ culpability
363
comes from the Court’s recent decision in Roper v. Simmons,
where the Court held that sentencing juveniles to death is un364
constitutional. The Court forwarded three major distinctions
between juveniles and adults that made juveniles inappropriate subjects for such harsh punishment. First:
[A]s any parent knows and as the scientific and sociological studies
respondent and his amici cite tend to confirm, “[a] lack of maturity
and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth
more often than in adults and are more understandable among the
young. These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered
365
actions and decisions.”

Second, “juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to
negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pres366
sure,” which makes it more difficult for them to extricate
themselves from negative circumstances that lead to bad behavior. Third, juveniles’ character is undergoing development,
367
and thus their character is neither fixed as good or bad.
These three distinctions led the Court to conclude that, regardless of their behavior, juveniles cannot be counted among
the “worst offenders” and, thus, do not warrant ultimate sanc368
tions.
The susceptibility of juveniles to immature and irresponsible behavior
means “their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as
that of an adult.” Their own vulnerability and comparative lack of
control over their immediate surroundings mean juveniles have a
greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to escape negative
influences in their whole environment. The reality that juveniles still
struggle to define their identity means it is less supportable to conL. REV. 563 (1999) (discussing why the juvenile justice system needs to be reformed and considerations reformers should take into account).
361. See, e.g., Cheryl B. Preston & Brandon T. Crowther, Infancy Doctrine
Inquiries, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 47, 50 (2012) (discussing the infancy doctrine in contracts).
362. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 337, at 293 (finding that negligence law
holds children to a standard of care based on their age, intelligence, and experience).
363. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
364. Id. at 578.
365. Id. at 569 (citing Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 305, 367 (1993)); see also
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982) (“Even the normal 16-year-old
customarily lacks the maturity of an adult.”).
366. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
367. Id. at 601 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
368. Id. at 569 (majority opinion).
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clude that even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evidence of
irretrievably depraved character. From a moral standpoint it would
be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult,
for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies
369
will be reformed.

For these same reasons, neither deterrence nor retribution is
370
served by executing juveniles.
The Court’s holding in Roper was based on the Eighth
Amendment, but its rationale is equally compelling in regard to
harsh forms of school discipline. Relying on Roper and the social science supporting the case’s outcome, the report Are Zero
Tolerance Policies Effective in the Schools? concludes:
There can be no doubt that many incidents that result in disciplinary
infractions at the secondary level are due to poor judgment on the
part of the adolescent involved. But if that judgment is the result of
developmental or neurological immaturity, and if the resulting behavior does not pose a threat to safety, weighing the importance of a particular consequence against the long-term negative consequences of
zero tolerance policies must be viewed as a complex decision, especially since adolescents appear to be more developmentally susceptible to
371
such lapses in judgment.

Josie Brown does not argue that the rationale of Roper
bars the use of expulsion or long-term suspension, but that, insofar as culpability is a relevant factor, it must be taken into
account, at the very least, with regard to the most severe forms
372
of punishment.
The Court’s recent substantive due process precedent regarding civil penalties makes the case for extending the culpability rationale and analysis from Roper to school discipline
even more compelling. In a series of cases that comprise the only pertinent substantive due process precedent in recent years,
the Court has held that punitive damage awards that are
“grossly excessive” in relation to the state’s interest “enter the
373
zone of arbitrariness that violates the Due Process Clause.”
The Court articulated a three-factor standard in BMW v.
374
Gore for assessing whether a damage award is grossly excessive: the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, the dispar369. Id. at 570 (citations omitted) (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815, 835 (1988)).
370. Id. at 571.
371. AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N ZERO TOLERANCE TASK FORCE, supra note
290, at 68, quoted in Brown, supra note 133, at 969.
372. Id. at 931–32.
373. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996); see also State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003).
374. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
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ity between the actual harm caused and the punitive damages
awarded, and the difference between the punitive damages in
the instant case and the criminal or civil penalties imposed in
375
comparable cases. The Court emphasized that “[p]erhaps the
most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive
damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct. . . . [E]xemplary damages . . . should reflect ‘the
376
enormity of his offense.’” The Court has since reiterated and
377
reinforced this approach in other cases.
Roper’s culpability rationale and evidence fall squarely
within BMW’s substantive due process limits on punishment,
particularly the reprehensibility factor. Together the cases reflect, at least, three broad principles. First, culpability cannot
be disregarded in assigning criminal or civil penalties. Second,
the lack of serious culpability is dispositive where the punishment to be imposed is also serious. Third, penalties should be
rationally, although not precisely, proportional to culpability,
even when the punishment is not extreme or ultimate.
b. Applying Culpability Analysis to School Discipline
If substantive due process operates to limit monetary
harms (which relatively speaking are minor) and the social science in Roper is generally applicable to minors, the foregoing
principles should follow in school discipline. Cutting against
the application of these principles to other contexts, however, is
the fact that Roper, BMW, and BMW’s progeny involved penal378
ties at the extreme of their respective paradigms. To apply a
stringent proportionality principle to all punishments could
place the courts in the position of a super legislature exercising
continual and final review of all criminal and civil punishments, which the Court has consistently made clear it will not
379
do. Thus, one could read the principles in the case not as generally applicable standards for all punishment—from the minor
to the serious—but rather as limits on extreme outliers.
375. Id. at 575, 580, 583.
376. Id. at 575 (quoting Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363, 371 (1852)).
377. See, e.g., State Farm, 538 U.S. 408.
378. BMW involved $2 million in punitive damages compared to $4,000 in
actual damages. BMW, 517 U.S. at 563, 565, 567. State Farm involved $145
million in punitive damages compared to $1 million in actual damages. State
Farm, 538 U.S. at 412.
379. Tracy A. Thomas, Proportionality and the Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence of Remedies, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 73, 134–35 (2007); see also Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975).
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A fair reading of the cases and context suggests that the
foregoing culpability and proportionality principles extend beyond the immediate context of those cases, but the principles do
not operate as broad limitations on every punishment that the
state might impose. First, the Court’s proportionality principle
in BMW contains its own self-limitation, which protects the decision from the problem of overreaching. As Professor Brown
emphasizes:
[T]he Court has looked for referents or comparators to gauge the fit
between punishment and conduct. The focal point of the Court’s disproportionality concern may be what is deemed an unacceptable deviation between the punishment imposed under the challenged regime
and the lesser punishment that would be imposed for functionally indistinguishable conduct dealt with under a parallel sanction regime of
380
the same sovereign.

In this respect, the Court is not exercising its own policy
preference as to punishment, but following the state’s own
broader punishment scheme. Second, as a practical matter, the
other two principles relating to culpability would not provide a
basis for judicial review of most punishments. Only where the
state ignored culpability altogether or imposed serious punishment for minor behavior would they be implicated. Because
culpability is so rooted in our traditions, the state rarely ignores it. Because extreme punishments are by their nature the
exception, the state rarely imposes them.
Even if those principles were not applicable across all paradigms, zero tolerance and harsh school discipline present a
compelling context in which to apply them. Like Roper and the
BMW line of cases, zero tolerance and expulsion involve extreme punishment: educational death penalties or second-class
citizenship, as this Article and the Fifth Circuit, respectively,
381
term it. As such, zero tolerance and harsh discipline fit within even a narrow reading of those cases’ applicability. The issue
of culpability, likewise, provides a strong basis for extending
the rationale of those cases. Student misbehavior is a result of
the same neurological immaturity and social environment determinism involved in Roper, which diminishes student culpability for whatever misbehavior a student is alleged to have
committed. Thus, zero tolerance and expulsion involve serious
punishment of individuals where serious culpability is likely
lacking. Yet, zero tolerance generally ignores the issue of culpability altogether, meaning that schools have not engaged in
380. Brown, supra note 133, at 979.
381. See supra notes 338–40 and accompanying text.
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any assessment of individual students’ culpability, which might
otherwise justify judicial deference to a school. In short, judicial
intervention in zero tolerance does not require an expansive interpretation of BMW’s holding or Roper’s culpability rationale,
nor a disregard for schools’ judgment.
Applying the other two explicit substantive due process
factors articulated in BMW—actual harm in relationship to the
382
punishment, and analogous punishments in other contexts —
reveal that various applications of zero tolerance and expulsion
are not even close to falling within the bounds of permissible
punishment. First, harm frequently does not exist. Students
with fingernail clippers and cough drops or Mr. Ratner, whom
383
the school admitted was no danger and did the right thing,
cause absolutely no harm to the educational environment, nor
do they pose a realistic threat of danger in the future. When the
actual harm is compared to the punishment, per BMW’s approach, long-term suspension is necessarily grossly disproportionate. As the concurring judge in Ratner wrote, school officials “jettison[ed] the common sense idea that a person’s
punishment should fit his crime in favor of a single harsh punishment, namely, mandatory school suspension. Such a policy
has stripped away judgment and discretion on the part of those
384
Ratner’s expulsion “is a calculated
administering it . . . .”
overkill when the punishment is considered in light of Ratner’s
good-faith intentions and his, at best, if at all, technical viola385
tion of the school’s policy.”
Second, a comparison of potential punishments outside of
school to those inside school also demonstrates the gross disproportionality of applying zero tolerance to students with minimal culpability. In fact, identifying an analog punishment outside of school is difficult because zero tolerance frequently
punishes behavior for which there would have been no punishment had it occurred anywhere else. For instance, one would be
hard pressed to identify a place in society where a minor could
not take nail clippers other than school. A student could freely
take them onto an airplane—one of the most heavily regulated
areas in society and the locus from whence we suffered one of

382. See supra notes 374–76 and accompanying text.
383. See supra notes 221–27 and accompanying text.
384. Ratner v. Loudon Cnty. Pub. Sch., 16 F. App’x 140, 143 (4th Cir. 2001)
(Hamilton, J., concurring) (per curiam).
385. Id. at 144.
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386

our greatest national tragedies in history. Even where some
relatively benign activity or item might be prohibited in society,
the response outside of school would be to take the item or stop
the behavior, not harshly penalize it. The only context in which
relatively benign activities or possessions might lead to punishment is prison, but prisoners have already committed crimes
and forfeited certain liberty and property rights, and the Supreme Court has directly rejected the notion that schools and
387
students are the equivalent of prisons and prisoners. To the
contrary, the Court has repeatedly found that students do not
shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse door, and
388
In
impositions on their rights require some justification.
short, it is hard to articulate any basis—much less a compelling
one—under the BMW three-factor analysis to validate the
broad application of zero tolerance and harsh discipline.
The debate in regard to applying BMW’s holding and Roper’s rationale to school discipline should not be whether to apply it, but how far. The underlying social science in Roper,
along with common sense, suggests that substantive due process culpability concerns could and should apply more broadly
in school discipline than they do in regard to criminal and civil
law in general. Aside from older teenagers who intentionally
engage in the most serious behaviors, such as bringing a handgun to school, expulsion is a grossly disproportionate and irrational response to student misbehavior, even when the behavior
is serious, and particularly when it is not. An elementary
school student who brings an actual weapon to school, for in389
stance, may have no appreciation of what he has done. His
conduct is no doubt serious, but to the extent his culpability is
non-existent, total deprivation of his education is disproportionate by BMW and Roper’s rationale.

386. TSA Issues Guidelines to Help Passengers Through Security and Expands List of Prohibited Items, TRANSP. SECURITY ADMIN. (Apr. 30, 2002),
http://www.tsa.gov/press/releases/2002/04/30/tsa-issues-guidelines-help
-passengers-through-security-and-expands-list.
387. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338–39 (1985); Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1968) (holding that
public schools cannot be “enclaves of totalitarianism”).
388. See, e.g., T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 338; Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574
(1975); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
389. See generally PENNY HOLLAND, WE DON’T PLAY WITH GUNS HERE:
WAR, WEAPON AND SUPERHERO PLAY IN THE EARLY YEARS (2003).
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c. Culpability Is Lacking with Minor Misbehavior
Outside of serious behavior like weapons and drugs, all
other misbehaviors by students are entirely normal and to be
expected. Adolescents as a class are impulsive, lack self-control,
need attention, do not always engage in a conscious decisionmaking process, and do not fully appreciate the consequences of
390
their actions. Thus, nearly every student will, at some point,
engage in disruptive classroom behavior by talking out of turn,
whispering in class, passing a note, and even responding to a
teacher in a way that can be construed as disrespectful. In fact,
a reasonable observer might be concerned about a student who
was quiet or withdrawn and never excited enough to breach
some minor rule of classroom, playground, or hallway decorum.
None of this is to say that classroom disruption should go unaddressed. One of the primary purposes and functions of school
391
is to shape and model good behavior. But the mandatory expulsion of such students borders on sadistic.
A disruptive student has not engaged in aberrational behavior, may not have acted with any disruptive intent, does not
pose a danger to others, and does not necessarily pose any more
risk of future disruption than any other student. Expelling a
disruptive student would certainly frighten and deter those
students with sufficient self-control to steer far clear of problematic behavior, but it would do little for students who lack
perfect self-control. Recognizing as much, federal special education law places specific limits and prohibitions on the suspension of students whose misbehavior is to be expected based on,
392
for instance, an emotional or behavioral disability. At the
other end of the spectrum, even among those with perfect selfcontrol, a percentage will predictably misbehave anyway as a

390. See Bonnie L. Halpern-Felsher & Elizabeth Cauffman, Costs and Benefits of a Decision: Decision-Making Competence in Adolescents and Adults, 22
J. APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 257, 268–69 (2001).
391. See Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (“[P]ublic education must prepare pupils for citizenship . . . . It must inculcate the habits
and manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to happiness and as
indispensable to the practice of self-government in the community and the nation.” (quoting CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, THE BEARDS’ NEW BASIC
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968))); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853, 864 (1982) (“We have also acknowledged that public schools are vitally
important . . . vehicles for ‘inculcating fundamental values necessary to the
maintenance of a democratic political system.’” (quoting Ambach v. Norwick,
441 U.S. 68, 76–77 (1979))).
392. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(1)(A), 1415(k)(1) (2012).
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protest to the schools’ irrational overkill. In short, expelling
disruptive students borders on punishment for the sake of punishment, not for any legitimate educational goal, because these
394
students’ culpability is generally low.
Although more controversial, data and social science would
indicate that some misbehavior is a product of the school rather
than inherent student characteristics and culpability. A
full
exploration of this premise is worthy of its own article. Here, it
suffices to state the basic findings and rationale. Schools that
fail to meet their obligations in delivering a quality education—
or are otherwise dysfunctional in terms of administration and
teaching—are the schools with the highest suspension and ex395
pulsion rates. Moreover, the failure to deliver a quality education is not just a pedagogical failure, but a state constitution396
al and federal statutory failure. The key question here is one
of causation. The troubled schools would argue that students
are not receiving a quality education because other students
are interfering and must be removed from school. Students
would tend to argue that excessive misbehavior occurs because
the schools are ineffective.
Data and social science studies tend to support the students. Studies show that the same student acts differently in
different classrooms, revealing a strong correlation between ef397
fective classroom management and educational outcomes.
Likewise, “when students transferred from a school with a high
dropout rate to one with a low dropout rate, their behavior
tended to conform to the low rate,” which negates the notion
that good or bad behavior emanates from the “inherent charac398
teristics of students.” Moreover, contrary to some schools’ po393. ARUM, supra note 85, at 181–82 (discussing students’ perception of
overly strict discipline and how it can exacerbate student misbehavior rather
than deter it).
394. See generally KAFKA, supra note 11, at 120 (“Rather than teach students appropriate habits of body and mind, zero tolerance policies are intended strictly to punish . . . .”).
395. KIM ET AL., supra note 75, at 9, 18.
396. See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301, 6311 (2012)
(mandating the teaching of core subjects and one hundred percent proficiency
in them); Allen W. Hubsch, Education and Self-Government: The Right to Education Under State Constitutional Law, 18 J.L. & EDUC. 93, 96–97 (1989)
(stating that all fifty states constitutionally guarantee education); Rebell, supra note 338, at 1527 (stating that a majority of state courts have held that
the state must provide an equitable and/or adequate education).
397. See LOSEN & MARTINEZ, supra note 9, at 2.
398. Dona M. Kagan, How Schools Alienate Students at Risk: A Model for
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sition that their high rates of discipline are necessary to maintain any semblance of order, punishing students in a dysfunctional education setting only makes matters worse and takes
399
more students further off track.
Hollingsworth, Lufler, and Clune summarize the research
on this point with the simple statement: “[S]chools which are
400
bad end up punishing their students.” None of this is to suggest that schools should take all the blame and students none,
nor that expulsions are off-limits in these schools. Rather, the
point is that where a school is failing to deliver its constitutionally and statutorily mandated educational quality, it bears
some culpability for students’ misbehavior. Given that students
as a class have diminished culpability regardless of environment, only a totalitarian or arbitrary state would harshly punish students in the context of a legally and pedagogically deficient environment, without even accounting for culpability.
3. Harm
Implicit in the foregoing Sections on intent and culpability
is the notion that the seriousness of a student’s behavior and
the potential ongoing danger or disruption the student poses
are necessarily relevant to discipline. The basis and justification upon which a district entirely excludes a student from
school is not simply that the student has done something he or
she has been instructed to avoid. A standard as bare as that
would be no less than totalitarianism and constitutionally infirm unless some other legitimate objective could be identi401
fied. The legitimate basis and justification is that the student
has harmed or poses some harm to the educational environment, either in terms of physical danger and disruptive behavior, or that punishment would prevent or deter that behavior in
the first instance. Either way, the goal must be tethered to real
402
or potential threats.
Examining Proximal Classroom Variables, 25 EDUC. PSYCHOLOGIST 105, 107
(1990) (citing Porter W. Sexton, Trying To Make It Real Compared to What?
Implications of High School Dropout Statistics, 5 J. EDUC. EQUITY & LEADERSHIP 92 (1985)).
399. HOLLINGSWORTH ET AL., supra note 134, at 19.
400. Id. at 18.
401. See generally RE-THEORIZING DISCIPLINE IN EDUCATION: PROBLEMS,
POLITICS & POSSIBILITIES 4 (Zsuzsa Millei et al. eds., 2010) (discussing the
problem of totalitarianism in discipline).
402. As the Court in BMW of North America v. Gore explained:
The sanction imposed in this case cannot be justified on the
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Broad zero tolerance policies do the opposite, seriously
punishing students who may pose no threat. They expel or suspend the elementary students with a pair of fingernail clippers,
the middle school student saving his friend from potential suicide, and the cub scout who uses his favorite utensil to spread
403
butter on his sandwich. If the rationale for expulsion is danger, it is irrational to expel these students. If it is deterrence, it
is still irrational because the punishment sweeps too far afield
of intent, culpability, and danger to be related to the deterrence
404
of students who actually pose a danger.
When pressed on these points, zero tolerance advocates
have responded with varying simplistic versions of “the rules
are the rules” and the only way to ensure safety and order is to
enforce the rules in existence. Districts insist that they must
draw hard lines in the sand and have no choice but to expel
405
students when they cross them. This line of reasoning presupposes the existence of a sufficient justification for rules and
punishment, when rules and punishment are not, in fact, selfvalidating or self-rationalizing. Line drawing is not a justification in itself. That a rule is written down and demands allegiance may address a procedural point, but it does not answer
406
the underlying issue of whether the rule is valid in substance.

ground that it was necessary to deter future misconduct without considering whether less drastic remedies could be expected to achieve
that goal. The fact that a multimillion dollar penalty prompted a
change in [the behavior of the defendant or defendant class] sheds no
light on the question of whether a lesser deterrent would have adequately protected the interests of [the State].
517 U.S. 559, 584 (1996).
403. See, e.g., Ratner v. Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Sch., 16 F. App’x 140, 141–42
(4th Cir. 2001) (per curiam); Ian Urbina, It’s a Fork, It’s a Spoon, It’s
a . . . Weapon? School Suspends Boy, 6, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2009, at A1.
404. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 584–85 (rejecting a damage award, even if it
achieved the state’s deterrent goals, because some lesser award may have
done the same).
405. Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 578 (6th Cir. 2000); Troyan, supra note
66, at 1640–42.
406.
[A school district] may not hide behind the notion that the law
prohibits leniency for there is no such law. Individualized punishment
by reference to all relevant facts and circumstances regarding the offense and the offender is a hallmark of our criminal justice system. In
a system where criminal offenders are afforded individualized punishment upon review of the facts and circumstances regarding the offense, students in our public school systems, who may also face a
daunting punishment, should at least be afforded a thorough review
of their case, prior to imposition of penalty.
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For the underlying rule to be valid, it must be based on a prop407
er goal and consider the necessary factors discussed herein.
E. THE PRESUPPOSITION OF KEY INQUIRIES IS PROHIBITED
Finally, due process prohibits decision-makers from deciding students’ fates in advance, and requires that they listen to
what the students say, deliberate the facts, and determine
whether further information is necessary before making a deci408
sion. This principle is both substantive and procedural. It is
Colvin ex rel. Colvin v. Lowndes Cnty., Miss. Sch. Dist., 114 F. Supp. 2d 504,
512 (N.D. Miss. 1999) (citation omitted).
407. Id. at 512–13.
408. See, e.g., id. An analogous problem recently arose in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), and its aftermath. The Court held that mandatory life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders violated the Eighth
Amendment. Id. at 2457–58. The open question following the case was whether the holding simply requires some discretion in the life without parole decision or whether there has to be an individualized sentencing hearing where
certain factors are considered. Most courts have found that it requires an individualized hearing. See, e.g., People v. Siackasorn, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 918, 922
(Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (“[Miller requires that] a ‘sentencer’ (‘judge or jury’) ‘follow a certain process’ before imposing this harshest possible penalty on a juvenile offender: i.e., consider the offender’s youth and the hallmark features of
youth (among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks
and consequences); and consider, in an individualized way, the nature of the
offender and the offense (for example, as relevant, the offender’s background
and upbringing, mental and emotional development, and possibility of rehabilitation).”); Daugherty v. State, 96 So. 3d 1076, 1079 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)
(“[U]nder Miller, judges must take an individualized approach to sentencing
juveniles in homicide cases and consider factors which predict whether a juvenile is amenable to reform or beyond salvation.”); State v. Bennett, 820
N.W.2d 769, 2012 WL 2816806, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. 2012) (unpublished table
decision) (“[Miller] requires that prior to sentencing a juvenile to life without
parole, the sentencing court take into consideration all pertinent factors—
namely an offender’s status as a juvenile and the numerous characteristics
that accompany this status.”); State v. Williams, 2012-1766, p. 1 (La. 3/8/13);
108 So. 3d 1169, 1169 (per curiam) (stating that in light of Miller “we require
[the sentencer] to take into account how children are different, and how those
differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison”
(internal quotation mark omitted)); Hye v. State, No. 2010-KA-01780-COA,
2013 WL 2303518, at *5 (Miss. Ct. App. May 28, 2013), cert. granted, 131 So.
3d 577 (Miss. 2014) (“The Court in Miller suggested factors to consider when
determining whether a juvenile should be sentenced to life or life without parole, including chronological age and its hallmark features, family and home
environment, circumstances of the homicide offense, and the possibility of rehabilitation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Bear Cloud v. State, 2013
WY 18, ¶ 44, 294 P.3d 36, 47 (Wyo. 2013) (“Miller requires an individualized
sentencing hearing for every juvenile convicted of first-degree murder at which
the sentencing court must consider the individual, the factors of youth, and
the nature of the homicide in determining whether to order a sentence that
includes the possibility of parole.”). These decisions are equally consistent with

BLACK_5fmt

2015]

1/25/2015 1:21 PM

ZERO TOLERANCE

901

procedural in that it requires particular processes and substantive in that these processes are aimed at producing a meaningful hearing and fair outcome. The substantive principle is
breached when the key inquiries to be determined through the
due process hearing are decided or significantly prejudiced in
409
advance. As the Court has explained, a “[p]resumption in favor of the “Government’s evidence” does not violate the Constitution, but only so long as that presumption “remain[s] a rebut410
table one and fair opportunity for rebuttal [is] provided.”
Also, inherent in this statement is that the government has
amassed some evidence to create a presumption, rather than
having adopted a presumption for its own sake.
Zero tolerance breaches this substantive principal. Many
zero tolerance policies effectively operate as irrebuttable presumptions that discipline is warranted. To be clear, laws and
regulations frequently operate on presumptions for reasons of
411
fairness, policy, or efficiency. Doing so does not necessarily
raise due process concerns. But when a presumption is
irrebuttable, particularly in regard to key aspects of liability, a
presumption eliminates the entire substance and purpose of a
due process hearing by narrowing the scope of the deliberation
too far. Rather than an assessment of action, intent, culpabilthis Article’s early argument that culpability is necessarily relevant in the severe punishment of minors. See supra Part II.B.2.
409. See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210, 215 (1977) (prohibiting the “shifting of the burden of persuasion with respect to [an important] fact”); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 644–46
(1974); see also John J. Garman & Ray Walker, The Zero-Tolerance Discipline
Plan and Due Process: Elements of a Model Resolving Conflicts Between Discipline and Fairness, 1 FAULKNER L. REV. 289, 298 (2010) (stating that zero tolerance policies operate on a presumption of guilt). The Court’s mandatory sentencing guideline cases reveal an analogous problem. There, the government
had set up systems whereby the jury would determine guilt based upon a few
predicate facts and then leave sentencing to judges, who would also consider
certain more complex facts. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 227–29
(2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 298–301 (2004). In those cases,
the Court found that legislatures cannot legislate certain facts and considerations out of the jury’s fact-finding process because those facts are necessarily
aspects of the crime that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury to decide. It is
the jury’s role to be a circuit breaker in the state’s machinery of punishment.
See, e.g., Booker, 543 U.S. at 226–27, 230; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305–07. School
discipline obviously involves a different context, but the underlying problem is
the same: a set of rules that deprive the fact finder from considering key inquiries.
410. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 534 (2004) (plurality opinion).
411. See, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 208–10
(1973).
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ity, and harm, these inquiries are often merged into a single
412
one: whether an act or event in question occurred. If, for instance, a weapon was found on a student, many school districts,
pursuant to due process, would conduct a hearing in which no
issues beyond that fact are considered. As Garman and Walker
write, “the basic concept of the zero-tolerance discipline policy
is the near-presumption of guilt founded upon a mere state413
ment of fact.” From this presumption or finding flows the second and more explicit irrebuttable presumption: that the ultimate sanction of exclusion is per se the appropriate response to
a student’s behavior. In effect, the school is just going through
the motions of process, but has no intention of actually deliberating the facts and issues at hand because it has already decided the outcome. This prejudgment, or sham process, violates
414
due process.
Schools’ primary response is that “[e]fficiency calls for
415
swift, decisive discipline that will fix the immediate problem.”
Efficiency and speed, however, cannot be justifications for
thoughtlessness in regard to the facts of a case and presumptions not grounded in reality. Efficiency and speed are justifica416
tions for limiting the exact type of process a school will afford,
as more formalized process can be burdensome. They are not
legitimate justifications for presuming answers to substantive
questions and making the presumptions irrebuttable. As one
court reasoned, the aim of due process is:
[T]o require school boards to fully consider the circumstances surrounding the misdeed as well as the penalty to be prescribed . . . . Employing a blanket policy of expulsion, clearly a serious
penalty, precludes the use of independent consideration of relevant
facts and circumstances. Certainly, an offense may warrant expulsion, but such punishment should only be handed down upon the
Board’s independent determination that the facts and circumstances
417
meet the requirements for instituting such judgment.
412. See Garman & Walker, supra note 409, at 302–03, 316.
413. Id. at 298.
414. See, e.g., In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (“A fair trial
. . . requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of
law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.”);
Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91 (1923); see also Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145, 155 (1878) (“[A] juror who has formed an opinion cannot be impartial.”).
415. Troyan, supra note 66, at 1640; see also Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308, 319 (1975).
416. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976).
417. Colvin ex rel. Colvin v. Lowndes Cnty. Miss. Sch. Dist., 114 F. Supp.
2d 504, 512 (N.D. Miss. 1999).
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In short, while a school or board’s judgments are accorded
deference, due process requires that those judgments be based
on an individualized consideration of inherently relevant facts.
No predetermined set of rules or decisions can validly eliminate
this adjudicative function. Moreover, without a consideration
of, for instance, the harm posed by a student, the basis upon
418
which a student is to be legitimately punished falls apart.
CONCLUSION
The prospect of success in challenging zero tolerance and
overly harsh discipline has been bleak for some time. Over the
past decade, this has meant that approximately three million
students per year have been excluded from school and deprived
419
of their statutory and constitutional rights to education. Once
excluded, these students fall into a new high-risk category for
subsequent exclusion, academic failure, drop-out, unemployment, and incarceration. Most distressing is the fact that most
of these students did nothing more than act out in ways that,
although disruptive to school, are not dangerous, serious, or
unexpected. Lower courts have done nothing to suggest schools
should be deliberate or thoughtful in this process.
Recent decisions by the Supreme Court regarding other
constitutional claims by minors, however, suggest that the judicial climate is susceptible to positive change, not because the
Court has grown more liberal, but because state actors have
grown overzealous in their treatment of minors. In fact, the
Court in the past few years has struck down the strip search of
420
a student for Tylenol as too invasive, indicated that the police
interrogation of a student at school must be informed by the
421
student’s age, and found that minors are unsuitable for crim422
inal law’s ultimate sanction. In other words, the state has
taken the flexibility previously afforded by the Court and
abused it or, at least, gone further than the Court is any longer
willing to tolerate. Schools have been just as aggressive in their
418. See, e.g., Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 575–76 (6th Cir. 2000); see also
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 314, at 561 (stating that substantive due process
requires a legitimate justification for the state’s action).
419. Rokeach & Denvir, supra note 19, at 282.
420. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 368, 379
(2009).
421. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2399, 2408 (2011).
422. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005); see also Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2457–58 (2012) (striking down mandatory life without
parole for minors).
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zero tolerance and harsh discipline policies, which are the primary impetus for activities like strip searching and interrogating students. Yet, zero tolerance is governed by a separate doctrine that requires a creative and reasonable analytical
solution if the courts are to intervene. Serious consideration of
the rationality of schools’ policies and the substantive due process principles that limit them provides that solution.

